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HOW THE CASE OF RAYMOND V. RAYMOND 2 
MADE A SHAMBLES OF INTERSPOUSAL 
GIFT PRESUMPTIONS AND THE 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN MATTERS 
OF TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
PAMELA E. GEORGE* 
 
1. With apologies to Everybody Loves Raymond, a situation comedy, starring Ray Romano, that ran 
on American television (CBS) from 1996–2005.  Everybody Loves Raymond, IMDB, https://www.imdb. 
com/title/tt0115167/ [https://perma.cc/C78R-SRLN].  As evidence of the “love” for Raymond, the 
show has been syndicated and is shown in the United States and several foreign countries and has even 
spawned a Russian spinoff.  Nick Holdsworth & Vladimir Kozlov, ‘Everybody Loves Raymond’ Remake 
Becomes Longest-Running Russian Version of a U.S. Show, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 2, 2016, 3:54 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/everybody-loves-raymond-russian-adaptation-925862 
[https://perma.cc/P6EX-TPTN].  The television show has absolutely nothing to do with the subject 
of this article. 
2. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).  This 
case has absolutely everything to do with the subject of this article, in that the Raymond opinion gives 
rise to this article. 
* Pamela E. George, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, has taught Texas 
Family Law and Texas Marital Property Rights for more than thirty-five years.  Professor George is 
Board Certified in Family Law and also Board Certified in Civil Appellate Law by the Texas Board of 
Legal Specialization.  A case that she was recently involved in, Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.), gave rise to her interest in the Raymond case.  
Professor George, lead appellate counsel for James Stearns, was successful in the Stearns case in 
escaping application of Raymond.  The Fourteenth Court of Appeals sitting in Houston specifically 
declined to follow Raymond in Stearns v. Martens, choosing to “agree with the body of cases in which 
courts of appeals hold that, if the instrument contains no separate-property recitals, then parol evidence 
is admissible . . . .”  Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 548 (first citing Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 
2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bahr v. Kohr, 
1
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980 S.W.2d 723, 726–27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); then citing Magness v. Magness, 
241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 
77, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).  It was from this practical experience that 
Professor George realized the havoc that could be wreaked should the analysis in Raymond be applied 
with regularity by Texas courts.  Special thanks is offered to Sarah Presas, John Flud, and James Harris, 
who, as students at South Texas College of Law Houston (now recent graduates) and members of the 
Law Review, aided in cite checking, quote checking, and in the expansion of certain footnotes.  
Mr. Flud also contributed to the analysis of the Raymond opinion.  Without the generous and brilliant 
help of these three, the publication of this article would have been much more difficult. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION & SCOPE 
In 2005, a unanimous panel of the First Court of Appeals sitting in 
Houston issued the opinion in Raymond v. Raymond, an opinion that denied 
a divorcing spouse the right to establish separate property by use of parol 
evidence.3  Surprisingly, Raymond has more often been noticed for its general 
language regarding standards of review4 and its holding regarding affidavits 
accompanying new evidence motions for new trial,5 rather than its departure 
from well-established and long-existing precedent of marital property 
characterization regarding interspousal gift presumptions, significant 
recitals, and the parol evidence rule.6 
 
3. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81. 
4. Raymond has been cited numerous times and utilized in briefs for the well-established legal 
tenet that an appellate court reviews a “trial court’s characterization of property under an abuse of 
discretion standard.”  Id. at 80 (citing Robles v. Robles, 965 S.W.2d 605, 613 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)); see also Rosensky v. Rosensky, No. 01–09–01029–CV, 2011 WL 743164 
at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2011, no pet.)  (mem. op.) (“We review the trial court’s 
characterization of property in a divorce under an abuse of discretion standard.” (citing Raymond, 
190 S.W.3d at 80; Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied))); 
Appellee’s Brief at 3, In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) 
(No. 06–12–0054–CV), 2012 WL 6813549, at *3 (determining abuse of discretion as the standard of 
review for property characterization in a divorce); Appellee’s Brief at 11, Jones v. Houston Structural 
Inc., No. 01–05–00834–CV, 2006 WL 2291010 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 10, 2006, no 
pet.), 2006 WL 583954, at *11 (“[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or 
arbitrary manner, or when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles.”). 
5. The wife in Raymond attempted to introduce evidence at the hearing on her “new evidence” 
motion for new trial.  Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 82.  The trial court barred her from introducing her new 
evidence because she had not verified her motion for new trial.  Id.  The First Court of Appeals held, 
“When a party seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the motion for new trial must 
verify that the evidence is true and correct.”  Id.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying introduction of the testimony offered as new evidence, nor did it err in summarily overruling 
the portions of wife’s motion for new trial that were based on new evidence.  Id. 
6. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910–12 (Tex. 1968) (declining to overrule a line of 
cases preventing extrinsic evidence from being admitted to prove property being held in trust instead 
of being separate property); Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. 1952) (“Since the deed 
states the nature of the estate conferred upon the wife and the consideration being contractual, parol 
evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the deed in the absence of allegations of fraud, accident 
or mistake.” (citing Goldberg v. Zellner, 235 S.W. 870, 872 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1921); Russell v. 
3
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While the Raymond case is, to this author’s mind, a dangerous anomaly, 
Houston’s First Court of Appeals did not reach their conclusion without 
precedent and careful analysis, distinguishing (or, more precisely, attempting 
to distinguish) the Raymond facts from contrary, well-established holdings.  In 
a nutshell, the Raymond case concerns husband’s transfer to wife of an 
undivided one-half interest in his separate property, husband having owned 
the property prior to marriage.7  The Raymond trial court found that the 
transferred property remained husband’s separate property.8  The appellate 
court reversed, deciding the property should be characterized as wife’s 
separate property as a matter of law9 and determining that parol evidence 
could not be introduced to establish the character of the property  as 
husband’s separate property.10  The basis for the appellate court’s decision is 
neither clearly enunciated, nor easily understood. 
On the one hand, it may be the mode of transfer11 (i.e., between spouses) 
upon which the Raymond court depends to explain its approach, treating 
the gift presumption that arises, if any,12 as rebuttable by parol evidence only 
if there is accident, fraud, or mistake.13  This will be referred to as the 
interspousal transfer theory, as opposed to a transfer from or involving a 
third party.  The Raymond court does espouse the theory that rebuttal of 
 
Russell, 120 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1934); Kidd v. Young, 190 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex. 
1945); Nye v. Bradford, 193 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1946); Markum v. Markum, 210 S.W. 835, 840–41 
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1919, writ dism’d))); McKivett v. McKivett 70 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1934) 
(stating parol evidence could not be permitted to contradict the conveyance of separate property); 
Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246, 253 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934, holding approved) (recognizing 
the allowance of parol evidence to show payment of property with separate funds); see also In re Marriage 
of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701, 715 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (noting the trial court allowed 
a party to enter extrinsic evidence about ownership of separate property). 
7. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (providing, in pertinent part, “All property, both real and 
personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or 
descent, shall be the separate property of that spouse”); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 
(establishing separate property of a spouse “consists of: (1) the property owned or claimed by the 
spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or 
descent; and (3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any 
recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage”). 
8. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79. 
9. Id. at 81. 
10. Id. 
11. Meaning the separate property transfer between spouses, or an interspousal conveyance, as 
distinguished from a conveyance to a spouse by a third party.  Id. 
12. The Raymond court is unclear whether the opinion hinges upon a gift presumption.  See 
generally id. (distinguishing the Raymond case from previous decisions where there was a rebuttable 
presumption of a gift between spouses). 
13. Id. 
4
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the interspousal gift presumption by parol evidence is limited to those 
situations in which husband purchases property from a third party and at 
time of purchase, and without a significant recital, has the property conveyed 
wholly or partially to wife.14 
Or, on the other hand the Raymond court may have considered the 
conveyancing language found in the Raymond deed15 to somehow be an 
express or significant recital, utilizing the significant recital theory.16  This 
being said, the Raymond court appears to have paid scant attention to the 
fact that there was an absence of language17 actually establishing the 
character of the property conveyed within the conveyancing documents.  
Such an absence of language would, under more prevalent, persuasive, and 
authoritative precedent, open the door for rebuttal of the gift by parol 
evidence.18  The problem is, neither the interspousal transfer theory, nor the 
significant recital theory as espoused by the Raymond court are anchored in 
classically accepted legal analysis of interspousal gift transactions. 
Although not an entirely renegade opinion, the Raymond analysis is so 
precariously founded as to be contrary to well-set Texas Supreme Court 
precedent.19  Indeed, the First Court’s sister court, Houston’s Fourteenth 
 
 
14. See id. (recognizing a line of cases where “a rebuttable presumption [was] raised that the 
spouse intended to give the other spouse an undivided one-half interest in the property as a gift” (citing 
Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 308–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ))). 
15. “Frank executed a deed to Brenda conveying an undivided one-half interest in the Lake 
Jackson property.”  Id. at 79. 
16. See id. at 81 (“When there has been a conveyance of property by one spouse to another . . . 
the presumption exists that it was the intention of the grantor spouse to make the property the separate 
property of the grantee spouse and in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, such conveyance 
cannot be disturbed.” (citing Brothers v. Brothers, No. 14–96–00364–CV, 1997 WL 7012, at *1 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication))). 
17. Such language establishing the character of property is referred to in common parlance as a 
significant recital or an express recital, which clearly establishes the character as separate, not merely an 
undivided one-half interest that could arguably be community or separate.  See Bahr v. Kohr, 
980 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (emphasizing the language used in 
express deeds that expressly convey property as separate property). 
18. See Peterson v. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. App.—Austin 1980, no writ) 
(recognizing a rebuttable presumption of a gift when a spouse purchases property with separate funds 
and adds the other spouse on the deed); Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 309 (affirming the trial court’s ruling 
because “[t]he evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of a gift”). 
19. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910–12 (Tex. 1968) (following precedent that 
extrinsic evidence not be admissible when a deed expressly states the property is conveyed as separate 
property); see also Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (discussing, at length, what constitutes 
significant recital). 
5
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 Court of Appeals, recently  declined to follow Raymond in Stearns v. Martens.20 
By way of this author’s thinking, the Raymond opinion, though well 
written, is erroneous, being an extension of a scant, few, earlier opinions that 
also erred in failing to recognize the subtle, but clear, nuances of 
interspousal gifts that are accompanied by writings, be they deeds21 or other 
documents.22  The Raymond case and its ilk have led bench and bar alike to 
improperly argue and even deny spouses the right to utilize parol evidence 
to establish the characterization of property conveyed between spouses 
during marriage.23 
This article will begin with an in depth analysis of the Raymond opinion 
in an attempt to diagram and dissect the appellate court’s reasoning in 
reversing the trial court and in disallowing (i.e., ignoring) husband’s evidence 
explaining why he placed his wife’s name on the deed to property that he 
owned before marriage—clearly his separate property.24  This first step will 
include an analysis of the cases which provided the path for the Raymond 
divergence and just how that divergence came to exist and proliferate. 
The analysis of Raymond and its precursors will be followed by an 
explanation of purchase money resulting trusts25 and the parol evidence 
rule.26  This is important because the principles of purchase money resulting 
trusts, together with the parol evidence rule, provide the foundation for the 
well-established law governing interspousal gifts and the presumptions 
arising therefrom; principles skirted, if not ignored by the Raymond strain 
of cases.  Once these basic trust and evidentiary principles are understood, 
 
20. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). 
21. Generally, at issue is real estate deeds.  See Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 912 (containing a significant 
recital in the deed); Peterson, 595 S.W.2d at 890 (allowing husband to testify when wife’s “name was 
subsequently added to the deed and the sale was consummated”); Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 309 
(containing no significant recital in the deed).  
22. In the more recent case of Stearns v. Martens, the property at issue was the stock in a closely 
held community corporation that was allegedly gifted to wife; the documents proffered included a letter 
and a bill of sale.  Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 548–50. 
23. See, for example, the position taken by wife and accepted by the trial court, but reversed on 
appeal in Stearns v. Martens.  Id. at 548. 
24. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (stating property owned before marriage is the separate 
property of the spouse with ownership); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (codifying the rules for 
separate property in Texas). 
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
26. Parol evidence is a contract principle.  “The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, 
but a rule of substantive contract law.”  Jarvis v. K & E Re One, LLC, 390 S.W.3d 631, 638 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 317 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1958); 
Edascio, L.L.C. v. NextiraOne L.L.C., 264 S.W.3d 786, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. 
denied)). 
6
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it becomes clear how the long recognized interspousal gift presumptions 
arose.  These same principles underlie the established boundaries for 
admitting evidence to rebut the interspousal gift presumption when those 
transactions are accompanied by documents of conveyance. 
Accordingly, the third portion of this article will explore those 
instances when a gift presumption can overcome the ever prevalent 
community  property  presumption;27 i.e., when property is acquired by one 
spouse using their separate property and that property is then placed—in 
whole or in part—in the name of the non-paying spouse.28  In such 
situations, the taking of title in the name of or title sharing with the non-
paying spouse, without a significant recital, creates a presumption of gift, 
rebuttable by parol evidence, a rule contrary to Raymond.29  The general rules 
regarding the use of parol evidence in establishing the character of those 
properties will be set forth.  The rebuttable nature of such conveyances 
will be explained and evidence that has been utilized in attempts to rebut 
this presumption will be explored, be such utilization successful or not. 
Following exploration of the gift presumption and the use of parol 
evidence, the fourth part of this article will identify and explore specific 
words of conveyance and their effect upon the use of parol evidence.  If 
certain words are utilized in a conveyance, the words could be deemed 
a significant or express recital.  A significant recital in a deed is one that clearly 
establishes “the intent to make the property conveyed the separate property 
of the wife . . . .”30  Proper significant recitals limit the use of parol 
evidence.31  The Texas Supreme Court has clearly and vehemently 
established the limited circumstances when parol evidence may be 
introduced to vary a deed that contains a significant recital,32 precedent 
wrongly expanded and misapplied in Raymond. 
Finally, the article will culminate in a survey of the deleterious impact that 
the Raymond case has had and why, from this author’s standpoint, it is critical 
 
27. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (“Property possessed by either spouse during or on 
dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.”). 
28. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1968) (describing a husband deeding land 
to wife based on fear of his son claiming the property through inheritance). 
29. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 
30. Kahn v. Kahn, 58 S.W. 825, 826 (Tex. 1900).  Of course, this would certainly apply to 
husband as well. 
31. Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 910. 
32. Id. at 911. 
7
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to understand the failure of the Raymond court’s analysis and, if not 
specifically overruled, why Raymond must be avoided. 
II.    RAYMOND V. RAYMOND, THE OPINION AND ITS PREDECESSORS 
In June of 1987, Brenda Raymond and Frank Raymond Jr. married, 
becoming husband and wife.33  Prior to marriage, husband owned two 
pieces of property, one being a lot in Lake Jackson,34 clearly his separate 
property, having been owned by him prior to marriage.35  It was on this 
separate property lot of husband’s where the couple built a home during 
their marriage.36 
Per wife’s request,37 “Frank executed a deed to Brenda conveying an 
undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property.”38  Upon 
divorce, the trial court determined that the Lake Jackson property, 
encompassing the home, was husband’s separate property and awarded the 
Lake Jackson property to him, confirming his separate ownership.39  Wife 
appealed this decision and other aspects of the divorce decree, as well.40 
A. Theory One—The Raymond Court Focuses on the Interspousal Transfer in 
Rejecting the Parties’ Position That Parol Evidence Can Be Used to Rebut the 
Gift Presumption 
That the Raymond transfer was interspousal underlies the appellate court’s 
first theory in its attempt to distinguish Raymond from those cases that 
allowed parol evidence of intent as a matter of course.41  As noted in the 
Introduction, supra Part I, the appellate court in Raymond puts great stock in 
 
33. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79. 
34. Id. 
35. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (establishing property owned prior to marriage as separate 
property); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(1) (“[S]eparate property consists of: (1) the property 
owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage . . . .”). 
36. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79. 
37. The First Court describes this as “Brenda’s urging” in its opinion.  Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. See id. (appealing the trial court “overruling certain points of error in the motion for a new 
trial because the motion was not verified” and the trial court “not requiring reimbursement to the 
community estate for funds spent on [husband’s] separate real property”). 
41. Id. at 80–81. 
8
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the mode of transfer, being interspousal rather than from or involving a 
third party.42 
Addressing the propriety of the trial court’s characterization of the Lake 
Jackson property as husband’s separate property, the appellate court’s analysis 
begins with the statement: “Both parties cite to cases holding that evidence 
of a gift of separate property from one spouse to another can be rebutted by 
evidence that a gift was not intended.”43  While the court recognizes that 
appellant and appellee, both parties/sides of the Raymond case, are treating 
the conveyance in question as a presumed gift that can be rebutted by 
evidence of intent, the court, nonetheless deems the cases the parties’ cite in 
support of this premise as inapplicable.  Specifically, the Raymond court 
attempts to distinguish the parties’ cites of In re Marriage of Morris44 and 
Johnson v. Johnson45 by stating, those cases “deal with situations where one 
spouse purchases real estate with his or her separate property, but both 
spouses’ names appear as grantees on the deed from that sale.”46  The Raymond 
court concedes that in such instance, “a rebuttable presumption is raised that the 
spouse intended to give the other spouse an undivided one-half interest in 
the property as a gift.”47  Yet the court ultimately determines that the 
Raymond conveyance whether a presumed gift or not is irrefutably wife’s 
separate property.48  While conceding that a rebuttable gift presumption 
 
42. See id. at 81 (“After Frank and Brenda married, Frank executed a separate deed to Brenda 
conveying an undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property.  Frank was the only grantor, 
and Brenda was the only grantee.”).  
43. Id. at 80 (citing In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, 
no pet.); Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 308–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ)).  The 
court’s acknowledgment that the parties ascribe to the notion that a gift presumption can be rebutted 
is followed in the opinion by a footnote, numbered 1, which explains: “Both parties assume that the 
deed, reciting a consideration of $10.00 ‘and other valuable consideration,’ evidenced proof of a gift.  
We recognize that there is conflicting case law on whether this is evidence of a gift or of valuable 
consideration.”  Id. at n.1 (citing Saldana v. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1990, no writ); Hall v. Barrett, 126 S.W.2d 1045, 1047 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1939, no writ)).  
Thereafter, the court, within the footnote, cites two cases establishing that conflict—gift versus sale.  
Id.  The court goes on to explain, “Our holding on appellant’s points of error [in Raymond], however, 
is the same regardless of whether the conveyance was a sale or gift.  Therefore, we will assume, without 
holding, that the conveyance [is] a gift.”  Id.  As discussed later, this statement appears to support the 
rejected possibility that the Raymond conveyance document was ambiguous and begs the question, 
“Why would the holding be the same?” 
44. In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.). 
45. Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ). 
46. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (citing Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308). 
47. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308–09). 
48. Id. 
9
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is raised in Morris and Johnson, the court does not provide analysis 
distinguishing those cases, but merely  states, “Those are not the facts of the 
present case.”49  Try as the Raymond court does, the cases upon which the 
parties relied for the rebuttable presumption premise are neither easily nor 
readily distinguishable from the Raymond facts.50 
Close consideration of the parties’ cited cases of Morris and Johnson 
establishes that the Raymond court’s conclusory reasoning is misguided.  
Morris and Johnson involve a spouse’s separate property purchase, during 
marriage, of property from a third party and a contemporaneous placement 
of the non-purchasing spouse’s name on the deed evidencing the purchase 
from the third party.51  In Morris, real property was purchased during marriage 
with husband’s separate funds, and wife conceded that husband paid for the 
property with separate funds while having the names of both husband and 
wife placed on the deed.52  The Morris court recognized that such transaction 
gives rise to the presumption that husband made a gift of half of the 
property to the wife.53  However, the Morris court also recognized that “[i]n 
order to rebut this presumption, evidence of the absence of an intent to 
make a gift must be shown.”54  While the husband in Morris failed in his 
appeal because he did not present proof of his intent, i.e., that he did not 
intend to make a gift, the Morris court nevertheless recognizes husband’s 
right to present parol evidence regarding his intent as to gift. 
Johnson55 also cannot be so readily distinguished from Raymond.56  Prior 
to marriage, the Johnson husband, without joining future wife, signed a 
 
49. Id. 
50. Compare In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d at 881 (noting the property in question “was 
purchased . . . during the marriage, but was paid for entirely with [husband’s] separate funds” and the 
deed was placed in both parties’ names), and Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308 (detailing that prior to marriage, 
husband signed a contract to purchase a house in which he alone was named as the purchaser, and 
shortly after marriage, “a deed was executed naming both husband and wife as grantees . . . 
[notwithstanding that] husband paid the entire purchase price out of his separate funds”), with Raymond, 
190 S.W.3d at 79 (summarizing that prior to marriage, husband bought the property in question, and 
later during marriage, husband “executed a deed to [wife] conveying an undivided one-half interest” in 
the property).  
51. See In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d at 881 (evidencing the property “was purchased . . . 
during the marriage, but was paid for entirely with [husband’s] separate funds”). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975)). 
55. See Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308 (demonstrating a deed executed naming both husband and 
wife as grantees, even though husband paid the entire purchase price out of his separate funds). 
56. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) 
(showing husband owned property before marriage and was the only grantee identified on the deed). 
10
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contract to purchase a home.57  The sale on the home closed after marriage, 
husband paid the entirety of the purchase price, and the deed was placed in 
the names of both husband and wife.58  Without questioning the propriety 
of considering the parol evidence that was introduced, it was determined that, 
based on parol evidence, the Johnson husband had no intent to make a gift to 
the wife.59 
The Raymond court attempts to distinguish that matter because husband in 
Raymond did not make the purchase during marriage, but rather added the 
wife’s name to a deed on property he already  owned.60  Specifically, 
husband in Raymond, conveyed “an undivided one-half interest in the 
Lake Jackson property.  Frank was the only grantor, and Brenda was the 
only grantee.”61  What appears to be the distinguishing factor for the 
Raymond court is that husband and wife were the only parties involved, an 
interspousal transfer, rather than a third party transfer to both husband and 
wife.  Perhaps the Raymond court utilized this interspousal transfer to invoke 
what they consider to be a different presumption, specifically:  
When there has been a conveyance of property by one spouse to another 
and a delivery of the deed, the presumption exists that it was the intention of the 
grantor spouse to make the property the separate property of the grantee spouse and in 
the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, such conveyance cannot be 
disturbed.62 
The foregoing does not reference  a gift presumption, but rather simply 
pronounces that there is a presumption of intent on behalf of the grantor to 
make the property the separate property of the grantee spouse.  The Raymond 
court’s approach seems to be based on Brothers v. Brothers.63  In Brothers, there 
was an interspousal conveyance of an undivided fifty percent interest in a 
parcel of real property, and the Brothers court stated: 
 
57. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 309. 
60. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79, 81 (“Here, it is undisputed that [husband] owned the property 
before the marriage . . . .”). 
61. Id. at 81. 
62. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Brothers v. Brothers, No. 14–96–00364–CV, 1997 WL 7012, 
at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication)). 
63. Brothers v. Brothers, No. 14–96–00364–CV, 1997 WL 7012 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] Jan. 9, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication). 
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It has long been the settled law in Texas that a husband can execute a deed 
directly to the wife and such conveyance, regardless of whether the property 
conveyed is the husband’s separate property or community property causes 
the property to become the wife’s separate property.  This is so even though the 
deed may not recite that the conveyance is for the wife’s sole and separate use.   When there 
has been a conveyance of property from the husband to the wife and a 
delivery of the deed, the presumption exists that it was his intention to 
make the property the separate property of the wife either by gift or by purchase, 
and in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, such conveyance cannot be 
disturbed.64 
The Brothers court does not require an express/significant recital for 
application of the rule regarding the necessity of fraud, accident, or mistake 
to vary a writing by parol evidence.65  Rather, Brothers and Raymond seem to 
imply that the interspousal nature of the conveyance itself is enough to 
establish an irrebuttable presumption that the conveyed property is now the 
donee spouse’s separate property absent a showing of fraud, accident, or 
mistake which would allow controverting parol evidence.66  Under this 
theory borrowed from Brothers, the Raymond court would not allow parol 
evidence unless threshold evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake was 
presented.67 
There are problems with this somewhat simplistic interspousal conveyance 
approach.  First, the Brothers opinion is an unpublished opinion from the 
Fourteenth Court of Appeals which the Fourteenth Court itself refused to 
 
64. Id. at *1–2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first citing Tittle v. Tittle, 220 S.W.2d 637, 
642 (Tex. 1949); then citing Belkin v. Ray, 176 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. 1943); Taylor v. Hollingsworth, 
176 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1943); McAdams v. Ogletree, 348 S.W.2d 75, 84 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 
1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Fitchett v. Bustamente, 329 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1959, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.); Forman v. Glasgow, 219 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Waco 1949, no writ); Hartman v. 
Hartman, 217 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Austin 1949, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Molloy v. Brower, 171 S.W. 
1079, 1079 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1914, writ ref’d); Bird v. Lester, 166 S.W. 112, 112 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1914, writ ref’d); Kin Kaid v. Lee, 119 S.W. 342, 343 (Tex. App.—Houston 1909, writ ref’d); 
and then citing Dyer v. Dyer, 616 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism'd)). 
65. Id. at *2. 
66. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (focusing on the parties’ marital relationship in the 
conveyance, rather than the recitals of deed, to evoke the presumption); Brothers, 1997 WL 7012, at *2 
(stating that the direct nature in which the conveyance occurs evokes the presumption). 
67. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (“A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not 
introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first 
tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 
426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970); Massey v. Massey 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, 
writ denied))). 
12
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follow in Stearns v. Marten stating: “The parties have not cited and research 
has not revealed any precedent from the Supreme Court of Texas 
determining this issue.  Lisa has cited a 1997 unpublished case from this 
court, Brothers v. Brothers . . . .  But, that case has no precedential value.”68 
Moreover, the Brothers opinion does not mention anything about the parol 
evidence rule and does not support the Raymond court’s use of the parol 
evidence rule to prohibit admission of evidence related to intent.69  While 
on the one hand seeming to eschew the need for an express recital because 
Raymond presents an interspousal transfer, the Raymond court nonetheless 
recognizes that, “A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not 
introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the 
deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.”70  
This leads to what might be referred to as the Raymond court’s second 
possible theory for denying parol evidence, that the Raymond conveyance 
language was significant. 
B. Theory Two—The Raymond Language of Conveyance Is Significant, Thereby 
Barring Consideration of Parol Evidence Absent Accident, Fraud, or Mistake 
While the Raymond court accepts that fraud, accident, or mistake is 
needed to contradict express recitals71 in a conveyancing document such as a 
deed, the court nonetheless fails to grasp the meaning of the very term used 
in the opinion, express recitals.72  Or, perhaps the Raymond court, without 
specifically saying it, deemed husband’s conveyance by deed, of “an undivided 
one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property.  Frank was the only grantor, and 
Brenda was the only grantee[,]” to be a significant recital.73 
 
68. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541, 548 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no 
pet.) (first citing Brothers, 1997 WL 7012; then citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7). 
69. See Brothers, 1997 WL 7012, at *1–2 (relying on “long . . . settled law in Texas” rather than 
the parol evidence rule). 
70. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (emphasis added) (citing Henry S. Miller Co., 452 S.W.2d at 431–
32; Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405). 
71. See id. (“Absent such evidence [of fraud, accident, or mistake], the trial court erred in 
considering parol evidence of intent.” (citing Dalton v. Pruett, 483 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1972, no writ))). 
72. See id. (focusing on “latent or patent ambiguity” with regards to the deed instead of on 
expressed recitals (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 
1995))). 
73. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Express recitals are sometimes referenced as significant recitals,74 and 
will be used interchangeably in this article as it is by the courts.  As will be 
discussed infra at note 232–33, the Raymond language conveyancing an 
undivided half interest cannot be considered a significant recital and 
accordingly the Raymond conveyance was devoid of express/significant 
recitals, just as were the conveyances in Morris75 and Johnson.76 
The court attempts to distinguish the Raymond circumstances from 
Morris and Johnson because the Lake Jackson lot was owned solely by 
husband prior to marriage and he alone added wife’s name after marriage.77  
Specifically, the Raymond court casts significance upon the fact that “Frank 
was the only grantor, and Brenda was the only grantee.”78  This observation 
is an apparent attempt by the court to distinguish the Raymond facts, because 
the conveyance was not from a third party as was the situation in Johnson and 
Morris.79  The Raymond court then goes on to identify the cases of Massey v. 
Massey,80 Coker v. Coker,81 Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans,82 and others referenced 
therein as controlling because those cases hold that “parol evidence is not 
admissible to vary the terms of an unambiguous document.”83  Yes, Massey 
and Coker, do stand for the proposition that parol evidence cannot be 
used to vary a document that is unambiguous (i.e., if a document is 
unambiguous, intent is irrelevant).84 
 
74. The Raymond court, instead of distinguishing the cases on the existence of express or 
significant recitals, distinguishes the cases on the fact that husband conveyed separate property owned 
before the marriage, not property acquired from a third party during marriage.  Id. 
75. See In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) 
(“[B]y acknowledging that [husband] intentionally placed the property in both of their names, he had 
exhibited a specific intent to make a gift to [wife].”). 
76. See Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ) (noting 
a deed was executed naming both husband and wife as grantees, but the husband paid the entire 
purchase price from his separate funds). 
77. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (“[I]t is undisputed that Frank owned the property before the 
marriage, and he was the only grantee named on that deed.  Therefore, it was his separate property 
from the inception.”). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 81–82. 
80. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). 
81. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983). 
82. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1970). 
83. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (citing Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405). 
84. See Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405 (emphasis added) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary 
the terms of an unambiguous document.” (citing Kennedy v. Kennedy, 619 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ))); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 (“In construing a written 
contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed 
14
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In Massey, the property in question was two parcels of real property in 
Colorado County, Texas and some bank stock.85  Husband asserted these 
properties were his separate property having been gifts, even though the 
deeds to the real property recited a sale and were accompanied by an 
$180,000 promissory note establishing that the property was acquired 
via a purchase during marriage.86  The sale documents unequivocally  
established that the subject properties were purchased during the Massey’s 
marriage.87  Husband in Massey wanted parol evidence introduced to vary the 
sale terms, to show that the property was gifted to him by his family.88  Massey 
husband explained that the sale language was incorporated only to escape 
gift tax consequences.89  The sale language was deemed by the court to be 
the “express language of these documents, which recite consideration, the 
transfers of property, which occurred during the parties’ marriage, were 
bargained-for exchanges.”90 
The sale in Massey was unambiguously established by documentary 
evidence.91  The Massey case has exacting, express, language of a sale in the 
conveyance document.92  In contrast, the Raymond conveyance document 
specifies neither a gift to the wife nor a sale to the wife.93  All that exists in 
the Raymond conveyance document is the simple transfer, naming the wife and 
reciting a symbolic $10 as consideration,94 giving rise to a rebuttable gift 
presumption.95  Massey and Raymond are not the same thing at all. 
 
in the instrument.” (citing R & P Enter. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex. 
1980); City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968))). 
85. Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 395. 
86. Id. at 405. 
87. See id. (reinforcing the idea that property obtained during marriage through “bargained-for 
exchanges” rather than by gift is property belonging to the community). 
88. See id. (finding “appellant offered the testimony” of family members in an attempt to 
convince the court the transactions “were made to look like credit transactions in order to avoid gift 
taxes”). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (emphasis added). 
91. See id. (“[T]he trial court correctly excluded the parol evidence and gave effect to the 
unambiguous terms of the written instruments . . . .”). 
92. See id. (“Under the express language of these documents, which recite consideration, the 
transfers of property, which occurred during the parties’ marriage, were bargained-for exchanges.”). 
93. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no 
pet.) (outlining the terms of the conveyance). 
94. See id. (explaining “Frank executed a deed to Brenda conveying an undivided one-half 
interest in the Lake Jackson property”). 
95. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1968) (illustrating a husband executing a 
deed to his wife although not intending it as a gift to her but for other reasons); Johnson v. Johnson, 
15
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While the court in the Raymond opinion recognizes that ambiguities within 
the conveyancing documents are a basis for allowing parol evidence, they 
reason that such does not control Raymond because there is no ambiguity and 
accordingly, did not allow the use of the parol evidence.96  Your author does 
not ascribe to the theory that parol evidence should have been allowed in 
Raymond because of an ambiguity; rather, she is of the mind that because 
there was no significant recital, parol evidence should be allowed. 
The Raymond court’s reference to ambiguities is additionally perplexing 
in light of footnote number one, which acknowledges that the Raymond 
parties ascribe to the notion that a gift presumption can be rebutted, going 
on to explain “[b]oth parties assume that the deed, reciting a consideration 
of $10.00 ‘and other valuable consideration,’ evidenced proof of a gift.  We 
recognize that there is conflicting case law on whether this [the language 
evidencing consideration] is evidence of a gift or of valuable consideration.”97  
It seems the court itself sets up the very ambiguity it denied.  Thereafter, the 
Raymond court elucidates within footnote one, citing two cases establishing that 
conflict between gift versus sale, explaining that their “holding on 
appellant’s points of error [in Raymond], however, is the same regardless of 
whether the conveyance was a sale or a gift.  Therefore, we will assume, 
without holding, that the conveyance is a gift.”98  Inexplicably, this statement 
appears to support the court’s rejected possibility that the Raymond 
conveyance document was ambiguous. 
The Raymond court cites National Union Fire Ins. Co., v. CBI Industries Inc.99 
to reiterate the generality that testimony of intent “can be introduced only if 
there is latent or patent ambiguity.”100  In the National Union case, at issue 
was a clause known as an “absolute pollution exclusion.”101  The Texas 
 
584 S.W.2d 307, 308–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ) (“[T]he deed named husband and wife 
as grantees . . . [thus creating] a presumption that the husband intended to give his wife an undivided 
one-half interest in the residence.” (citing Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1972, no writ); Carriere v. Bodungen, 500 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1973, no writ))). 
96. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (“[P]arol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of an 
unambiguous document.” (citing Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405)). 
97. Id. at 81 n.1 (citing Saldana v. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, 
no writ); Hall v. Barrett, 126 S.W.2d 1045, 1047 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1939, no writ). 
98. Id. 
99. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., v. CBI Indus., 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995). 
100. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d at 520).  
101. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d at 518–19 (discussing the role of parol evidence in 
contract disputes and explaining the meaning of an absolute pollution exclusion clause).  The National 
Union policy contained the following exclusion:  
16
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Supreme Court in National Union reversed the intermediate court that had 
remanded the trial court’s summary judgment for further discovery.102  The 
Texas Supreme Court determined that reversal was necessary because all 
facts relevant to the interpretation of the clause were already in the record 
thus obviating the need for discovery.103  The Texas Supreme Court held: 
“The ambiguity must become evident when the contract is read in context 
of the surrounding circumstances, not after parol evidence of intent is 
admitted to create an ambiguity.”104  In contract construction parol 
evidence is not permitted to create an ambiguity;105 with this your author 
has no quarrel.  However, immediately after citing National Union, the 
Raymond court, concludes that when a spouse fails to establish an 
ambiguity, fraud, or mistake, the gift presumption must prevail,106 citing 
Dalton v. Pruett,107 Brothers v. Brothers, and Dyer v. Dyer.108  The Raymond court’s 
leap of logic will be examined. 
It is understandable why Dalton v. Pruett led the Raymond court to reach its 
conclusion.  In Dalton v. Pruett, prior to marriage husband owned a lot and 
constructed a home on it.109  After marriage, husband, for recited 
consideration of $8,500.00, conveyed the home to his wife.110  The deed 
did not specify whether the $8,500 was from wife’s sole and separate 
property or that the property was being conveyed for her sole and separate 
 
This policy does not apply to . . . any Personal Injury or Property Damage arising out of the actual 
or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants, anywhere in the world; . . . 
“Pollutants” means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste material.  Waste materials include materials 
which are intended to be or have been recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 
Id at 519. 
102. Id. at 520, 522. 
103. See id. at 522 (“The language in this pollution exclusion is clear and susceptible of only one 
possible interpretation in this case.  Because there are no latent or patent ambiguities in the policies, 
there are no fact issues that merit discovery.”). 
104. Id. at 521. 
105. See id. at 521. (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the meaning of 
the explicit language of the parties’ written agreement.” (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 
317 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1958); Lewis v. E. Tex. Fin. Co., 146 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Tex. 1941))). 
106. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no 
pet.) (analyzing the presumption created when a spouse conveys real property to the other spouse). 
107. Dalton v. Pruett, 483 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1972, no writ). 
108. Dyer v. Dyer, 616 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism’d). 
109. Dalton, 483 S.W.2d at 927–28. 
110. Id. at 928. 
17
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use.111  The Dalton court, relying on Pevehouse v. Pevehouse112 and Forman v. 
Glasgow,113 concluded the home was wife’s separate property, even without 
recital in the deed that the property was paid for by wife’s separate funds 
or was being conveyed as the wife’s separate property or for her separate 
use.114  The Dalton court further said that it made no difference whether the 
property conveyed by husband to wife is community or husband’s separate; 
it will by conveyance from husband to wife, alone, be considered wife’s 
separate property.115  Finally, the Dalton v. Pruett court referenced the 
presumption that husband, by conveyance, intended to make a gift to 
wife and then opined that absent fraud or mistake, the presumption could 
not be rebutted.116  While the Houston court’s opinion in Raymond can 
perhaps be understood in the solitary light of Dalton v. Pruett, the cases 
cited in Dalton v. Pruett and reiterated in Raymond as support do little to 
sustain their holdings. 
Dalton v. Pruett depends on Pevehouse v. Pevehouse, where husband and wife 
owned community property that was, during marriage, conveyed to the wife 
as her separate property.117  As evidenced by the opinion, the Pevehouse 
conveyance was by significant recital, express language, establishing wife’s 
ownership, thus: 
Originally the appellant and appellee owned as their community property the 
west one-half (W/2) of Section Ten (10), Block J–S, in Lubbock County, 
Texas.  Long before this divorce proceeding, W. M. Pevehouse deeded 
this land to Myrtle Pevehouse as her separate property. . . .  The deed recited 
that W. M. Pevehouse for and in consideration of the sum of $500 to him in 
hand paid by Mrs. Pevehouse out of her separate estate and funds acquired by her 
from inheritance as follows: “Cash paid, the receipt of which hereby is 
acknowledged and confessed.” Then it proceeded to grant, sell and convey the 
property to Mrs. Myrtle Pevehouse in her individual and separate right, and further 
 
111. Id. 
112. Pevehouse v. Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1957, writ dism’d). 
113. Forman v. Glasgow, 219 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.—Waco 1949, no writ). 
114. See Dalton, 483 S.W.2d at 928 (highlighting a long-recognized rule in Texas that a husband’s 
deed to wife causes the property to become wife’s separate property, regardless of whether the deed 
recites it as such). 
115. See id. at 928–29 (addressing the presumption that property, whether community or 
husband’s separate property, conveyed from husband to wife becomes wife’s separate property). 
116. See id. at 929 (“When there has been a conveyance of property[,] . . . the presumption exists 
that it was [the spouse’s] intention to make the property the separate property [of the other 
spouse] . . . .”). 
117. Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d at 771. 
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provided: “and I do hereby bind myself, my  heirs, executors and administrator 
to Warrant and Forever Defend, all and singular the said premises unto the 
said Mrs. Myrtle Pevehouse in her separate right, her heirs and assigns, against every 
person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part 
hereof.”118 
The Pevehouse court made clear that when a recital119 unquestionably 
establishes that property was meant to be conveyed as separate, such a 
recital can only be rebutted by establishing the “conveyance was procured 
by fraud, mistake[,] or undue influence.”120  The appellate court in 
Pevehouse determined that the husband’s testimony, the parol evidence, 
should not have been considered by the trial court as the document 
including the significant recitals was controlling.121  The appellate court 
rendered judgment that the property in question was the separate property of 
the wife as established in the document of conveyance which could not be 
varied absent fraud, mistake, or undue influence.122 
That being said, there are general statements within  
Pevehouse, emanating from early editions of Texas Jurisprudence123  
 
118. Id. (emphasis added). 
119. The court refers to it as a “specific declaration.”  See id. at 772 (explaining that specific 
declarations of this kind create presumptions the court will be unlikely to overturn). 
120. Id. 
121. The testimony, as related in the opinion, is some of the more colorful in cases such as this.  
Accordingly, that portion of the opinion is worthy of being quoted: 
Appellee was asked by his attorney if he ever gave his wife the farm for love and affection.  He 
did not deny giving the farm for love and affection but stated he had no love and affection for 
her and never had any love or affection for her although the record reflects they had been man 
and wife for forty-two years at the time of this separation and had two children that are now 
grown and married.  He was further asked by his attorney if he at any time since 1932 executed a 
deed of conveyance to his wife for this half section of land intending to convey title to her.  His 
answer was, “No.”  He did not remember much about the deed and did not know whether he 
gave the deed to Mrs. Pevehouse or not.  Appellee acknowledged: “If I signed it and if I 
acknowledged it, why it would have been for the purpose that she could have it.”  We think this 
undisputed record shows appellee signed, acknowledged and delivered the deed in question.  This 
deed cannot be varied simply by the appellee testifying he never executed a deed of conveyance 
to his wife for this land intending to convey title to her. 
Id. at 773. 
122. Id. at 774. 
123. See id. at 772 (“Husband's Deed to Wife—There is no reason why the husband may not execute 
a deed directly to his wife.  The validity of such a deed is determined by general principles.  There must be 
present the essentials, such as consideration and delivery.” (citing 23 Tex. Jur., p. 157, § 128 (current version 
at 39 Tex. Jur. 3d Family Law § 233 (2017)))). 
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and early cases124 that do not make the limitation on parol evidence so 
inextricably tied to the existence of significant recitals.  However, it 
cannot be overlooked that the Texas Supreme Court case cited in support of 
those general statements in Texas Jurisprudence, Belkin v. Ray,125 very clearly 
contains a significant recital in the conveyance from husband to wife; as the 
Belkin court explained: “Harry Marks conveyed this property  to his wife, Ray 
Marks.  This deed recites a cash consideration of $1 and love and affection.126  It 
also recites that the property is conveyed to Ray Marks as her separate 
estate.”127  The Belkin case belies any assertion that a conveyance without a 
significant recital, between husband and wife, establishes a gift presumption 
that cannot be rebutted absent fraud or mistake of other equitable 
grounds.128 
The Houston First Court of Appeals, in Raymond, seems to have 
juxtaposed contract cases dealing with ambiguities with cases regarding 
significant recitals and interspousal gifts, while ignoring the difference 
between interspousal conveyances that contain significant recitals and those 
that do not. 
The Raymond court also cites Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, along with the 
previously discussed Massey for the proposition that “[a] spouse who is a party 
to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to 
contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence 
of fraud, accident, or mistake.”129  However, it cannot go unnoticed that 
Henry S. Miller, as other cases cited in Raymond, dealt with a conveyance 
 
124. See Forman v. Glasgow, 219 S.W.2d 845, 846–47 (Tex. App.—Waco 1949, no writ) 
(holding property that was clearly community was conveyed for consideration of $5.00 by husband to 
wife and became part of wife’s separate estate, even though the deed, while mentioning the meager 
consideration, contained no statement that the funds were separate or that the property was being 
conveyed either as a gift or to the wife’s separate estate). 
125. Belkin v. Ray, 176 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1943). 
126. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).  These words, “love and affection,” have been understood as 
showing intent to make a gift.  See generally Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d at 772 (discussing which declarations 
within a conveyance create certain presumptions). 
127. Belkin, 176 S.W.2d at 165 (emphasis added). 
128. See Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d at 772 (“The effect of the husband’s deed to the wife . . . is to 
constitute the estate the separate property of the grantee.  The instrument could have no other meaning, 
and this is true whether it recites that the conveyance is for the sole separate use of the grantee or 
not.”). 
129. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) 
(citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex.1970); Massey v. Massey, 
807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)). 
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including a significant recital.130  Specifically, the Miller court noted that the 
deed “recited a consideration of $1.00 and a vendor’s lien note for $8,000.00, 
paid and to be paid out of Nancy Shoaf’s ‘sole and separate estate,’ and that this 
property was conveyed to her as her ‘sole and separate estate.’”131 
The foregoing analysis of cases cited by the Raymond court belie the 
court’s refusal to consider parol evidence.  This assertion is strengthened 
by other cases yet to be discussed, and basic trust and evidentiary principles 
that underlie the well-established rules regarding interspousal 
conveyances. 
III.    THE PRINCIPLES OF RESULTING TRUSTS AND PAROL EVIDENCE 
OVERLAP A SPOUSE’S RIGHT TO OFFER PROOF OF SEPARATE OWNERSHIP 
A. Basic Trust Principles Support the Use of Parol Evidence in Circumstances Such 
As Were Presented in Raymond 
While not frequently referenced or discussed, the underpinnings for the 
rules governing interspousal gifts are the rules governing purchase money 
resulting trusts.132  It is important to understand these rules not only for 
the purpose of application, but also to understand and grasp the historical 
context of and the gravitas attached to presumptions arising from 
interspousal transfers, so readily used, and occasionally ignored, by bench 
and bar alike. 
1. Restatement of Trusts §§ 440, 441 
The general rule governing resulting trusts provides, “Where a transfer of 
property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a 
resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom the purchase price is 
paid, except as stated in [sections] 441, 442 and 444.”133  This rule means 
that when a person pays (the payor) for property, but legal title is passed to 
one that has not paid, a trust results to the benefit of the payor who will then 
hold the beneficial title.134  Pursuant to section 441, such a trust will not 
result “if the person by whom the purchase price is paid manifests an 
 
130. Henry S. Miller Co., 452 S.W.2d at 428–29. 
131. Id. (emphasis added). 
132. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS §§ 440–443 (AM. LAW INST. 1935) (referencing 
rules applicable to transfers of property where a resulting trust arises). 
133. Id. § 440. 
134. Id. 
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intention that no resulting trust should arise.”135  This intention would, 
of course, be established by parol evidence explaining the payor’s intention 
at the time of the conveyance. 
The foregoing are the general resulting trust rules and are inapplicable 
to those in a confidential relationship such as husband and wife.  The 
exceptions mentioned in section 440, and quoted in the introduction to this 
portion of the article, along with sections 442 and 443, provide the base by 
which interspousal conveyances are analyzed. 
2. Restatement of Trusts §§ 442, 443 
Husbands and wives, and others within close relationships, are subject 
to Restatement of Trusts section 442,136 which provides: 
Purchase in the Name of a Relative.  Where a transfer of property is made 
to one person and the purchase price is paid by another and the transferee is a 
wife, child or other natural object of bounty137 of the person by whom the 
 
135. Id. § 441. 
136. See id. § 442 (outlining property transfers between relatives or spouses). 
137. The phrase “other natural object of bounty of the person by whom purchase price is paid,” 
can give rise to interesting questions within family law cases.  However, delving into who might be the 
natural object of one’s bounty is beyond the scope of this article.  For the curious, the comments at 
section 442 do offer some elucidation, thus: 
The rule stated in this Section [442] is applicable where the payor and transferee respectively 
are in the relation of husband and wife; father and child; mother and child; father-in-law and son-
in-law; grandparent and grandchild.  It applies to the relation of parent and child although the 
child is an illegitimate or an adopted child.  It is immaterial that the child is an adult.  It applies 
also where the payor stands in loco parentis to the transferee; that is, where the payor whether or 
not related to the transferee has assumed to act in the place of a parent of the transferee. 
It does not apply where the payor and transferee respectively are wife and husband, [to this, 
your author takes exception as wives/women are, throughout the Texas Family Code, treated 
without regard to gender in matters of property] or child and parent.  It does not apply where the 
payor does not stand in loco parentis to the transferee merely because the payor and transferee 
respectively are brothers or sisters, uncle or aunt, or nephew or niece. 
It applies where the payor is a man and is engaged to be married to the transferee, but not 
where the transferee is already married to another person.  It does not apply to unmarried persons 
unlawfully cohabiting.  
b) Effect of the rule.  The fact that the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty 
of the payor is more than merely a circumstance tending to rebut the inference of a resulting trust.  
It is of itself a circumstance sufficient to raise an inference that a gift was intended, and the burden 
is upon the payor seeking to enforce a resulting trust to prove that he did not intend to make a 
gift to the transferee (see [section] 443).  If the transferee is related to the payor, but is not in such 
a relation as to be a natural object of bounty of the payor, this circumstance is not enough to raise 
22
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 3, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss3/3
  
2019] NOT EVERYBODY LOVES RAYMOND 831 
purchase price is paid, a resulting trust does not arise unless the latter manifests 
an intention that the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the 
property.138  
Per the foregoing, application to the wife (or child) is specified, thereby  
barring a section 440 resulting trust in favor of the payor; rather, a gift to the 
wife or child is presumed.139 
So, if a spouse pays for property with their separate property and places it 
in the name of the other spouse, a gift to the named spouse will be presumed.  
This is inapposite of section 440 establishing a resulting trust, but it is not a 
rebuttal to section 440 as found in section 441.  Rather, section 442 is a 
presumption unto itself that can only be rebutted by section 443, thus: 
Rebutting the Presumption of a Gift to a Relative.  Where a transfer of 
property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, and 
the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the person 
by whom the purchase price is paid, and the latter manifests an intention that 
the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the property, a resulting 
trust arises.140 
That is, even if the one holding the beneficial interest is the natural object of 
the payor’s bounty, a trust could result if such was intended at the time title 
passed.  The payor’s intention at the time of the conveyance would, 
necessarily, be established by parol evidence. 
Section 443 of The Restatement of Trusts makes clear that the 
presumption of gift may be rebutted in the exact situation that arose in the 
Raymond case.141  However, the Raymond case is a departure from the 
established rule because the parol evidence offered by husband was 
barred and not considered by the appellate court in making its decision. 
While the Restatement of Trusts establishes the basic presumptions 
which arise when a conveyance is made to one person and the purchase 
price was paid by another, these sections do not encompass the effect 
of significant recitals within the conveyancing documents. 
 
an inference that a gift was intended, but it is a circumstance which can be shown with other 
circumstances as tending to rebut the inference that a resulting trust arises . . . . 
Id. § 442 cmt. a–b. 
138. Id. § 442 (emphasis added). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. § 443. 
141. See id. (outlining ways to rebut the gift presumption in conveyances to relatives). 
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IV.    MARITAL PROPERTY  CHARACTERIZATION AND APPLICATION 
OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRESUMPTION IN LIGHT OF 
RESULTING TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
The Texas Family Code provides that all “[p]roperty possessed by either 
spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community 
property.”142  This is the presumption whether property is held in the name 
of husband, wife, or both spouses and it applies to all property possessed.  
This is the beginning point of every divorce case—all property is presumed 
community.143 
A. The Community Property Presumption Can Be Rebutted and in Fact Supplanted 
by the Facts of a Conveyance 
While beginning with the presumption that all property held by the 
spouses is community, spouses have the right to rebut the community 
property presumption and prove any property as separate.144  This right 
was most clearly established, more than eighty-years ago, by the case of Foster 
v. Christensen.145  In Foster v. Christensen, land was conveyed by wife’s parents to 
husband and wife, and daughter/wife and her husband executed a promissory 
note.146  The deed did not reflect by recital or otherwise that wife had a 
separate interest in the property.147  However, when faced with the 
possibility that this property  would be lost in husband’s bankruptcy, wife 
asserted that the cash down payment was made, and future payments would 
be made, from her separate monies.148  At trial, wife was denied the right to 
present this evidence.149  The Texas Supreme Court held, “The wife’s 
 
142. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a). 
143. See id. § 3.003 (establishing the community property presumption). 
144. See id. § 3.003(b) (“The degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate 
property is clear and convincing evidence.”). 
145. Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934, holding approved).  Foster 
v. Christensen is a complicated case wherein husband’s bankruptcy filing and loss of the property wife 
claimed as separate also involved wife’s parents, who sought to repossess the property in question 
because wife had not paid for the property per agreement.  Id. at 248.  Wife’s right to establish and 
thereby protect such as separate property, so parents could claim under her right, was recognized.  Id. 
at 249–52. 
146. Id. at 248. 
147. See id. (“The deed contained no statement that the land was intended to be the separate 
property of either of the grantees.”). 
148. Id. at 249.  In Foster, wife’s parents, who were claiming property through their daughter’s 
separate interest, sought to repossess said property and eliminate it from husband’s bankruptcy estate.  
Id. at 248. 
149. Id. at 249. 
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separate ownership of property, although standing in the name of her 
husband or appearing on record to be community property, may be proven 
as any other fact by any competent evidence, including parol evidence, 
surrounding circumstances, and declarations of the parties.”150  Very 
simply, if it is established that consideration for such property was paid by a 
spouse’s separate funds, and no gift to the other spouse was intended,151 
the property is the separate property of the paying spouse.  While Foster v. 
Christensen did not resolve the character of the subject property, it did 
establish a spouse’s right to prove the separate character of property claimed 
to be separate.152  Even though this case did not involve the dissolution 
of a marriage, the right to prove the separate character of property 
recognized therein has been steadily applied by Texas courts in matters of 
divorce and probate.153 
Likewise, when property is from a third party to the spouses, in what 
appears to be a gift to both rather than a purchase, parol evidence can be 
used to rebut the gift presumption.  In Von Hutchins v. Pope,154 mother 
deeded the property to her brother, the uncle of mother’s married daughter, 
with the request that the uncle, after mother’s death, deed the property as a 
gift to the married daughter.155  The deed from the uncle named daughter’s 
husband as well as daughter; nonetheless, parol evidence was allowed to 
 
 
150. Id. (first citing McClintic v. Midland Grocery & Dry Goods Co., 154 S.W. 1157, 1158–59 
(Tex. 1913); Presidio Mining Co. v. Bullis, 4 S.W. 860, 863 (Tex. 1887); Carter v. Bolin, 30 S.W. 1084, 
1085 (Tex. App.—Austin 1895, no writ); SPEER’S LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS (3d ed.) §§ 428–429; then 
citing Cummins v. Cummins, 224 S.W. 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1920, no writ); SPEER’S LAW 
OF MARITAL RIGHTS (3d ed.) §§ 406, 428, 429, 437). 
151. In Foster v. Christensen, no presumed gift to husband, by his being named, was asserted.  This 
may have been a result of the era in which the case arose, when gifts from wives to husbands were not 
given the deference of gifts from husbands to wives, or it may have been that any interest husband 
might have had would have been subject to claims through the bankruptcy trustee. 
152. See id. at 253 (holding that a spouse should be allowed to offer proof of separate property 
as evidence when the character of the property is at issue). 
153. See Nesmith v. Berger, 64 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied) 
(looking to appellant’s prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, which asserted all property be separate, 
as sufficient evidence of nonexistent community property); Orr v. Pope, 400 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. 
App.—Amarillo 1966, no writ) (“It is settled that property acquired during marriage takes its status 
as separate or community property at the time of its acquisition, and that such status is fixed by the 
facts or circumstances by its acquisition at that time.” (citing Smith v. Buss, 144 S.W.2d 529, 531–32 
(Tex. 1940); Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. 1952))). 
154. Von Hutchins v. Pope, 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1961, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.). 
155. Id. at 645. 
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establish the gift was meant for daughter, alone.156 
It is well accepted that a spouse may prove the separate character of 
property when conveyed by a third party to either or both spouses, as 
was shown in the previously discussed case of Johnson157 which was even 
recognized by the Raymond court.158  The problem, in terms of the Raymond 
opinion, is the court’s divergent view of transfers between the spouses. 
B. Deeds From One Spouse to the Other, Transferring the Entirety or a Portion, 
Give Rise to a Gift Presumption Which, in the Absence of a Significant Recital, 
Can Be Rebutted 
As noted above, if there is property in existence at the dissolution of the 
marriage, the entirety of the property will be presumed community.159 
However, in a phenomenon that seems unique to Texas community 
property  cases, the presumption and the accompanying burden of proof can 
switch by virtue of a simple conveyance.160  For example, when a deed 
is from the husband grantor to the wife as grantee and contains no 
significant recital, the normal community property presumption is replaced 
by the presumption that husband is making a gift to wife, whether the 
deeded property be separate or community,161 in the absence of parol 
evidence to rebut the presumption of gift; and of course, vice versa, be it 
wife to husband.162  If the conveying spouse offers parol evidence disputing 
 
156. Id. at 644–45. 
157. See Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ) 
(validating parol evidence indicating that property purchased with separate property assets and 
thereafter conveyed by deed naming both husband and wife as grantees was in fact separate property). 
158. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no 
pet.). 
159. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (“Property possessed by either spouse during or on 
dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.”). 
160. Compare id. § 3.001(2) (stating property acquired by gift during marriage is separate property), 
with id. § 3.005 (presuming interspousal gifts of property to include all income and property that arise 
from such property). 
161. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975) (proffering the rebuttable 
presumption of gift where husband purchases community property in the name of both spouses with 
separate property assets during marriage); In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 883–84 (Tex. 
App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (affirming the rejection of husband’s argument rebutting presumption 
of gift); City Nat’l Bank of Eastland v. Kinnebrew, 190 S.W. 536, 538 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1916, 
writ ref’d) (clarifying that husband’s payment on wife’s debt against wife’s separate property and taking 
of deed to said property in wife’s name constituted evidence of gift). 
162. See Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (discussing 
the shifting burdens of proof and the rebuttable presumption of separate property gifted between 
spouses). 
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the gift, the conveying spouse has the burden to establish that the property 
conveyed was not meant as a gift.163 
This principle of Texas marital property law has long been recognized.  
The oft-cited Texas Supreme Court case of Cockerham v. Cockerham164 
presents most unusual circumstances from whence an assertion of the gift 
presumption arose.  In Cockerham, prior to his marriage, husband owned an 
undisputed separate property interest in half of a 320-acre tract; the other 
half belonged to husband’s brother.165  During marriage, husband 
purchased his brother’s share and, through a complicated transaction, the 
entirety of the property was conveyed to husband and wife.166  The trustee 
in bankruptcy argued that by conveying (or reconveying) the entirety to 
husband and wife, husband could be presumed to have made a gift to wife 
of one half of his separate property half.167  Nonetheless, the Texas 
Supreme Court recognized that the gift presumption “can be rebutted by 
evidence clearly establishing there was no intention to make a gift.”168  The 
conveyance of the entirety of the tract was found by the trial court, and 
ultimately upheld by the Texas Supreme Court, to be “a means of 
convenience provided by law to complete the purchase of the whole and 
secure a loan thereon.”169  Half of the 320-acre tract was recognized as 
husband’s separate property, while the remaining 160-acres was recognized 
as a community acquisition.170 
This holding of the Texas Supreme Court was preceded by a long line of 
 
 
163. See id. at 432 (discussing the pleadings filed by wife to rebut the presumption of a gift she 
made to husband by arguing “she had executed the deed under duress and that she did not intend to 
make a gift”). 
164. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975). 
165. Id. at 166–67. 
166. Id. at 167. 
167. See id. at 167–68 (“The trustee alternatively contends that if the husband had a separate 
property interest . . . he made a gift of an undivided one-half of such separate property interest to his 
wife . . . .  [I]t is presumed he intended the interest placed in his wife to be a gift.” (citing Smith v. 
Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 314–15 (1856); Tucker v. Carr, 39 Tex. 98, 99 (1873); Tate v. Tate, 299 S.W. 310, 
311–12 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1927, no writ); Carriere v. Bodungen, 500 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1973, no writ); Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
1972, no writ); 1 MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 92 (2d ed. 1956))). 
168. Id. at 168 (citing Strahan, 16 Tex. at 314–15; Dean v. Dean, 214 S.W. 505, 507–08 (Tex. 
App.—Austin 1919, no writ); Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d at 316; Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255, 258 
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ); 1 MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 92 
(2d ed. 1956)). 
169. Id. at 167. 
170. Id. at 168. 
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cases, including, as were cited in Cockerham: Smith v. Strahan;171 Dean v. 
Dean;172 Hampshire v. Hampshire;173 and Paterson v. Metzing.174 Likewise, 
Cockerham has been followed by a good many cases espousing this same 
principle, that a gift presumption, when arising from a conveyance that does 
not include a significant recital, can be rebutted by parol evidence.  
Including: Roberts v. Roberts;175 Harrison v. Harrison;176 and, Reaves v. 
Reaves.177 
This history brings us to the Raymond case. By way of reminder, the Raymond 
case involved husband’s placement of wife’s name on the title to a piece 
of property husband owned prior to marriage and the appellate court’s 
holding that parol evidence could not be used to show the intent husband 
had in adding wife’s name to the deed.178  Rather, the appellate court held 
the conveyance yielded an irrebuttable presumption of gift to the wife and, 
absent fraud or mistake in the conveyance itself, barred presentment of 
parol evidence.179 
 
171. Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 322 (1856) (finding the rational foundation of gift 
presumption when “the purchase is intended as a provision for the [receiving spouse]” and explaining 
that this presumption is “more easily rebutted than it would be where the [receiving spouse] has no 
interest in community property, and a very restricted right to separate” property) 
172. Dean v. Dean, 214 S.W. 505, 508 (Tex. App.—Austin 1919, no writ) (holding lower court 
erred by refusing to permit husband to testify that his reason for placing the deed in wife’s name was 
that his employment as a brakeman was dangerous, and if he died, he wanted wife to be able to sell the 
property without probate concerns; the court found this testimony material on the issue of whether 
appellant-husband intended to gift the property to wife). 
173. Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314, 316 (holding husband’s testimonial denial of 
intent to give wife an interest in his house and lot was inconclusive to establish that he did not intend 
to make a gift and merely raised a question of fact that the trial court resolved in favor of wife—a 
finding  upheld on appeal). 
174. Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ) 
(confirming the gift presumption can be rebutted by evidence clearly establishing an intention to make 
a gift, but ultimately holding that plaintiff’s evidence was factually insufficient to rebut the 
presumption) (citing Dean, 214 S.W. at 508). 
175. Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (noting gift 
presumption is rebuttable by parol evidence to establish deed procurement through duress or undue 
influence). 
176. Harrison v. Harrison, 321 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no 
pet.) (explaining that after “evidence contradicting the presumption [of gift] has been offered, the 
presumption disappears and is not weighed or treated as evidence”) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 
873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex. 1993))). 
177. Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland 
Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op) (regarding wife’s testimony and other corroborating evidence as 
sufficient to rebut gift presumption by clearly establishing that wife did not intend to make a gift). 
178. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 
179. Id. 
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C. The Question Now Begged: What Is Parol Evidence? 
As is obvious, parol evidence, as barred in Raymond, is very much the focus 
of this article.  The proper admission of parol evidence in relation to 
interspousal conveyances must be understood to realize the error of the 
Raymond court.  The rules of evidence do not encompass what is known as 
the parol evidence rule.  As explained in Jarvis v. K&E Re One, L.L.C.:180 
“The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but a rule of substantive 
contract law.”181  The fact that the bar to parol evidence should arise out 
of contract law makes sense because the viability of contract law hinges 
upon the dependability of a written agreement (i.e., the parties to a written 
agreement should be able to depend upon their negotiated, written, and 
executed document as representing the entirety of their agreement).  Indeed, 
that is what the court seemed to focus on in deciding Raymond, that the 
document in question was not ambiguous, stating:  
Frank never presented evidence at trial of fraud, accident, or mistake [in entering 
the agreement]; nor did he establish any ambiguity in his deed to Brenda.  Absent 
such evidence, the trial court erred in considering parol evidence of intent.  
The deed was unambiguous on its face, and, as a matter of law, it effectively 
transferred an undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property to 
Brenda.182 
The Raymond court takes a rather myopic view of parol evidence by their 
limitation of what is deemed the proper circumstance allowing for the use 
of parol evidence.  The Raymond court seemingly restricts the use of parol 
evidence to ambiguous agreements183 or when the subject agreement, 
itself, is entered into by fraud, accident or mistake.184  While it could be 
argued that the Raymond conveyance really is ambiguous, as inferred but not 
 
180. Jarvis v. K & E Re One, L.L.C., 390 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). 
181. Id. at 638 (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 317 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. 1958); Edascio, 
L.L.C. v. NextiraOne L.L.C., 264 S.W.3d 786, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)). 
182. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Dalton v. Pruett, 
483 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1972, no writ)). 
183. See id. (comparing the Raymond case to Massey, where the court “held that parol evidence is 
not admissible to vary the terms of an unambiguous document” (citing Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 
391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied))). 
184. See id. (“A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic 
evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, 
accident, or mistake.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970); Massey, 
807 S.W.2d at 405)). 
29
George: Not Everybody Loves Raymond
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
838 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:809 
held by the Raymond court itself,185 it is nevertheless the law that an 
interspousal agreement or transfer need not be ambiguous to trigger the 
allowance of parol evidence.186  The Raymond court’s strict and limiting use 
of parol evidence ignores those general civil cases, as well as the interspousal 
transfer cases, that have approved the admission of parol evidence to 
“‘clarify, explain, or give meaning to terms of a contract that are facially 
incomplete.’  Therefore, to the extent parol evidence demonstrates a prior or 
contemporaneous agreement collateral to and consistent with—that does 
not vary or contradict—the contract, [parol evidence] can be 
considered.”187 
For example, in Ward v. Marino,188 a case not involving an interspousal 
conveyance, a home owner and a plumber entered into a contract for 
plumbing services.  However, the contract did not encompass matters such 
as a description of the entirety of the work to be performed, the charge for 
the work, or whether the charge would be limited to what could be 
collected from the insurance company.189  Recognizing that it is almost 
universally accepted that the parol evidence rule bars testimony or other 
extrinsic evidence that would have the effect of altering, expanding, or 
contradicting an unambiguous document,190 the Ward court held that the 
use of parol evidence was properly admitted because “where a writing is 
incomplete or ambiguous, parol evidence becomes admissible to explain the 
writing or to assist in the ascertainment of the true intention of the parties 
 
185. Arguably, the first footnote in Raymond supports the rejected possibility that the Raymond 
conveyance document was ambiguous.  See id. at 80–81 n.1 (“Our holding on appellant’s points of 
error, however, is the same regardless of whether the conveyance was a sale or gift.  Therefore, we will 
assume, without holding, that the conveyance was a gift.”). 
186. See Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (“[W]e 
find that the parol evidence rule does not prevent introduction of evidence to rebut the presumptions 
of community property and gift.”). 
187. Tex–Fin, Inc. v. Ducharne, 492 S.W.3d 430, 443 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, 
no pet.) (citation omitted) (first quoting Boondoggles Corp. v. Yancey, No. 01–05–00185–CV, 
2006 WL 2192708, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2006, no pet.); then citing David J. 
Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Hua Xu v. Lam, No. 14–13–
00730–CV, 2014 WL 5795475, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.)). 
188. Ward v. Marino, No. 13–00–00784–CV, 2002 WL 253789 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
Feb. 21, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 
189. Id. at *1. 
190. See David J. Sacks, P.C., 266 S.W.3d at 450 (deeming an attorney’s fee contract unambiguous 
and parol evidence rightly barred even though a total cost, or a cap on cost, for services to be rendered 
was not included in the contract); Lewis v. E. Tex. Fin. Co., 146 S.W.2d 977, 979–80 (Tex. 1941) 
(finding a lease for land was unambiguous and thus that the trial court erred in allowing parol evidence). 
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insofar as the parol evidence does not alter or contradict any part of the 
written memorandum in question.”191 
Not only did the Raymond court ignore the more lenient, general civil cases, 
the opinion also failed to recognize that interspousal conveyances also 
trigger a more lenient approach to parol evidence.  Accordingly, another 
shortcoming of the Raymond court is the failure to recognize that, parol 
evidence is allowed to explain interspousal transfers because such is 
consistent with the law of resulting trusts previously discussed192 and 
can be used to explain a conveyance.  
An example of parol evidence being allowed in an interspousal 
conveyance that was addressed in light of resulting trust law is the case 
of Bahr v. Kohr.193  Specifically, the Kohrs claimed and the trial court found 
that property conveyed to husband and wife during their marriage was the 
separate property of the wife having been purchased with wife’s separate 
funds.194  The San Antonio Court of Appeals noted that when such a 
purchase by or through a spouse’s separate funds or property occurs, and 
title is taken in the name of both spouses, a gift to the non-paying spouse 
will be presumed.195  In essence, the community property presumption is 
replaced by the presumption that the paying spouse intended to make a gift 
to the other spouse.196  As the San Antonio court noted in the Bahr v. Kohr 
case: “This rule is consistent with the principles of trust law concerning 
purchase money resulting trusts.”197  Citing Cockerham,198 the San Antonio 
court opined that parol evidence can be and was properly utilized to rebut 
the presumption of gift and to establish separate property, because parol 
 
191. Ward, 2002 WL 253789, at *1–2 (emphasis added) (citing First Victoria Nat’l Bank v. 
Briones, 788 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied); Patterson v. Patterson, 
679 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ); Warren Bros. Co. v. A.A.A. Pipe 
Cleaning Co., 601 S.W.2d 436, 438–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
192. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS §§ 440–443 (AM. LAW INST. 1935) (implying the 
use of parol evidence as a potential means of preventing a resulting trust from forming). 
193. Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). 
194. Id. at 726. 
195. See id. (highlighting the gift presumption that arises when a spouse uses separate property 
to acquire property that is treated as a part of the community during marriage). 
196. See id. (“[A] presumption arises that the purchasing spouse intended to make a gift of one-
half of the separate funds to the other spouse.” (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 
(Tex. 1975); In re Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994, writ denied))). 
197. Id. (citing In re Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d at 273). 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 164–71 for discussion of the Cockerham case. 
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evidence would “clarify, explain, or give meaning to terms of a contract that 
are facially incomplete[.]”199 
On appeal, the Bahrs argued that parol evidence should be proscribed, 
and the Kohr wife should not be able to use parol evidence to establish the 
questioned property as her separate, citing Massey v. Massey.200  The San 
Antonio Court of Appeals recognized that, generally, “When a writing is 
intended as a completed memorial of a legal transaction, the parol evidence 
rule excludes other evidence of any prior or contemporaneous expressions 
of the parties relating to that transaction.”201  However, the Bahr v. Kohr 
court analyzed Massey; and as explained earlier, the Massey conveyancing 
document contained express/significant recitals with an accompanying 
promissory note establishing the acquisition as a purchase during the 
marriage and not a gift to Massey husband from his family.202  Accordingly, 
the Massey court was correct in determining that parol evidence could not 
be used to vary a writing establishing purchase by the community unless 
there had been fraud or accident or mistake in entering into the 
transaction.203 
Likewise, the San Antonio court distinguished the Bahr matter from Henry 
 
 
199. See Tex–Fin, Inc. v. Ducharne, 492 S.W.3d 430, 443 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2016, no pet.) (“[T]o the extent parol evidence demonstrates a prior or contemporaneous agreement 
collateral to and consistent with . . . the contract, it can be considered.” (citing David J. Sacks, P.C. v. 
Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Hua Xu v. Lam, No. 14–13–00730–CV, 
2014 WL 5795475, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.))); Bahr, 980 S.W.2d 
at 726–27 (“[T]he [gift] presumption can be rebutted by evidence of the absence of an intent to make 
a gift.” (citing Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 168)). 
200. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 726 (“The Bahrs argue that in cases where the community property 
is land evidenced by an unambiguous deed, parol evidence will not be admitted to rebut the 
presumption of community property.” (citing Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied))); see also supra text accompanying notes 84–94 for discussion of 
the Massey case. 
201. Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 726 (citing Muhm v. Davis, 580 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e)). 
202. See id. (noting the Massey court did not allow parol evidence when the documents were 
unambiguous); Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405 (recognizing the deeds of trust and promissory notes 
contained language sufficient to prevent admission of parol evidence).  
203. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 725 (“[A] spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not 
introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first 
tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Massey, 
807 S.W.2d at 405))); Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405 (stating the same: “A spouse who is a party to a deed 
transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed 
without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 
452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970))). 
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S. Miller, Co. v. Evans204 because the pertinent Miller instruments of 
conveyance established that the properties were explicitly conveyed to the 
wife as her separate property.205  The San Antonio court, recognizing that 
there was no significant recital, ultimately held: “The parol evidence rule 
does not prevent introduction of evidence to rebut the presumptions of 
community property and gift.”206  A like outcome should have occurred in 
Raymond. 
While the San Antonio court’s opinion in Bahr v. Kohr is one of the more 
recent opinions to approach this issue of parol evidence from a scholarly 
resulting-trust perspective, it is only one of many opinions to reach this 
result.  For example in Carter v. Carter,207 husband testified, in keeping with 
Peterson v. Peterson,208 that the inclusion of his wife’s name on the deed of the 
subject property was the doing of the title company and not done at his 
behest.209  Husband’s testimony so explaining was deemed properly 
admitted and rebutted the gift presumption.210 
Further, in Galvan v. Galvan,211 wife urged that the trial court erred in 
allowing parol evidence to vary the effect of a deed as a presumed gift 
from husband’s parents to their son/her husband and to her as his 
wife.212  The parol evidence was admitted “to rebut prima facie 
presumptions of a gift to appellant [wife] of an [undivided] one-half 
interest . . . .  From the evidence the court concluded that the tract was the 
separate property of appellee [husband].”213  The Galvan court recognized 
that parol evidence could be utilized to establish the true intent of the parties 
 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 129–31 for discussion of the Henry S. Miller case. 
205. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 727 (“In the Miller case, a deed recited that the conveyed property 
was the separate property of the wife.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co., 452 S.W.2d at 429)). 
206. Id. 
207. Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). 
208. Peterson v. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1980, writ dism’d w.o.j.). 
209. Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 781.  The Peterson document did not include any statement as to the 
character of property or the identity of the funds with which it was acquired or for what purpose it was 
acquired or that it was a gift; to those the document was silent.  See Peterson, 595 S.W.2d at 890–91 
(holding the property at issue was separate property by tracing the entire purchase back to the separate 
funds of the husband). 
210. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d at 892. 
211. Galvan v. Galvan, 534 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.—Austin 1976, writ dism’d w.o.j.). 
212. See id. at 399–400 (stating appellant appealed, claiming an undivided one-half interest in a 
tract of land). 
213. Id. at 400. 
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to vary presumptions arising from non-specific recitals.214  As the Galvan 
court explained, while husband’s intention to gift to wife or the intent of a 
grantor to include wife in a gift may be established by parol evidence, the 
ultimate determination as to whether the gift presumption has been 
overcome rests with the finder of fact, be it judge or jury.215 
A more recent holding, also recognizing the propriety of parol 
evidence, is the aforementioned case of Stearns v. Martens.216  The Stearns 
case involved a company, Stearns Pools and Spas, that husband had founded 
prior to marriage.217  After a few years of marriage, the Stearns business was 
incorporated and of the one million shares issued, forty-nine percent of 
the shares were placed in husband’s name and fifty-one percent were placed 
in the name of the wife.218  There were no significant recitals identifying 
whether these shares were separate property of the respective spouses, or 
separately acquired, or gifted, or whether the shares were community; 
accordingly, the community property presumption would be applied.219  
That is, the shares placed in the names of the respective spouses were 
presumed community upon issuance. 
Not only did the Stearns husband work in the pool business, he was also 
active in the reserve military which included a deployment to Iraq and later, 
in 2008, a deployment to Afghanistan.220  Prior to his deployment, 
husband and wife signed a stock transfer agreement and husband thereby 
 
214. See id. (“Recitals of a deed are not conclusive as to consideration, and inquiry by parol 
evidence may be employed to show the real consideration, if there was any.” (citing Puckett v. Frizzell, 
377 S.W.2d 715, 721 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1964, no writ); Kleck v. Kleck, 246 S.W. 720, 723–24 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1922, no writ))). 
215. Id. 
216. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) 
(“[W]e agree with the body of cases in which courts of appeals hold that, if the instrument contains no 
separate-property recitals, then parol evidence is admissible regarding the marital-property issue.” (first 
citing Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland 
Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 726–27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
1998, no pet.); then citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. 
denied); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no 
pet.))). 
217. Id. at 545. 
218. Id. 
219. See id. at 547–48 (implying no recital took place because husband’s pool company was 
formed into a corporation and stocks were issued).  
220. See id. at 545(stating husband served in the Army Reserve and was deployed to both Iraq 
and Afghanistan). 
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transferred the 490,000 shares in his name to wife.221  As explained by the 
appellate court: 
The Agreement provides, among other things, that “[Jim]222 hereby sells 
all of [Jim’s] Stock of [Stearns Pools] to [Lisa]223 and [Lisa] hereby purchases 
such Stock from [Jim] in exchange for the payment of Ten and no/100 
Dollars and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged.”  The Agreement does not 
contain any statement that any part of its consideration was Jim’s separate 
property, nor does the Agreement contain the terms “gift,” “partition,” 
“separate property,” “separate use,” or “separate estate.”  After the transaction, 
Stearns Pools’s corporate records reflected that Lisa owned all of the 
outstanding shares of common stock.224 
Within days after husband returned from Afghanistan,225 wife filed for 
divorce and claimed that all of the pool company stock was her separate 
property and while husband disputed this claim, the trial court rendered a 
directed verdict in favor of wife that the forty-nine percent of stock that 
husband transferred to wife was wife’s separate property.226  This 
characterization, among a myriad of other trial court determinations, was 
appealed by husband.227  Interestingly enough,228 wife did not urge just 
one theory to support her separate property claim, but as the appellate 
court explained, she asserted at least three, thus: 
Lisa asserted that she had proved as a matter of law that the 490,000 shares in 
Stearns Pools were her separate property under three theories:  
(1) By means of the Agreement, Jim made a gift of these shares to Lisa; 
 
221. Id. 
222. James, referred to as Jim in the opinion, is the husband in Stearns.  Id. 
223. Lisa Martens is the wife in Stearns.  Id. 
224. Id. at 545.  On appeal, Jim urged that the trial court erred in granting Lisa’s request for a 
directed verdict establishing that the 490,000 shares were Lisa’s separate property as a matter of law, 
thereby foreclosing Jim’s right to present evidence of his lack of donative intent; the appellate court 
held that the trial court erred, sustaining Jim’s argument.  Id. at 546–47. 
225. Within two days of his returning home, Lisa filed for divorce.  Id. at 545. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 546. 
228. Perhaps if Lisa had remained true to one theory of separate characterization, her claim 
would have appeared more plausible. 
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(2) The Agreement is a valid and enforceable partition or exchange 
agreement under Family Code section 4.102; and 
(3) The Agreement is a valid means of making the shares the 
separate property of Lisa by a sale of the shares from Jim to Lisa. 
Lisa also argued that under the Agreement all one million shares of Stearns 
Pools were made her separate property.229 
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston was very clear in its holding 
that Lisa did not, as a matter of law, prove her separate property claim, 
disapproved of the Raymond opinion, and determined that husband had 
the right to have his parol evidence heard as to his intention in 
transferring the forty-nine percent of the Stearns Pools and Spas stock before 
he deployed.230  The Stearns court’s holding is worthy of quotation: 
[W]e agree with the body of cases in which courts of appeals hold that, if 
the instrument contains no separate-property recitals, then parol evidence is 
admissible regarding the marital-property issue.  Because the Agreement 
contains no separate-property  recitals, parol evidence is admissible regarding 
the marital-property issue, and there is no irrebuttable presumption that the 
transferred shares are Lisa’s separate property.231 
The Stearns conveyance was incomplete in terms of characterizing the 
property or in providing any facts which would summarily establish the 
character of the stock.  Likewise incomplete was the Raymond agreement, 
which—as described by the Houston court—was a separate deed executed 
by husband after marriage, conveying to wife “an undivided one-half interest 
in the Lake Jackson property.  Frank [husband] was the only grantor, and 
Brenda [wife] was the only grantee.”232  The court further describes the 
 
229. Id. at 545.  While the trial court directed a verdict that forty-nine percent of the stock—
490,000 shares originally issued in Jim’s name and later conveyed by Jim—were Lisa’s separate 
property, the character of the remaining fifty-one percent—510,000 shares initially placed in Lisa’s 
name—was presented as a jury question.  Id.  The jury found that the initial 510,000 shares placed in 
Lisa’s name were community property.  Id. 
230. Id. at 548. 
231. Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 
3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 
723, 726–27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); then citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 
910, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 80–81 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). 
232. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81. 
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conveyance, thus: “The deed was unambiguous on its face, and, as a matter 
of law, it effectively transferred an undivided one-half interest in the Lake 
Jackson property  to Brenda.”233  An undivided one-half interest does not 
establish separate character.  The Raymond conveyance provided no more 
language of intent than did the conveyancing documents in Stearns which 
the Stearns court described as having “no separate-property recitals”234 
thereby incapable of creating an irrebuttable presumption of separate 
property235 and holding “parol evidence is admissible regarding the marital-
property issue.”236 
As made clear by the Stearns court, the significant or express recital is the 
deciding factor as to whether parol evidence can be presented to rebut the 
presumption of a gift.237  The Raymond court simply glossed over this 
requisite by the statement, “A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may 
not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the 
deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.”238  The 
Raymond court never avails the reader of the language that was considered by 
the court to be the express recital leaving the reader to speculate that perhaps 
the mere conveyance of “an undivided one-half interest”239 could perhaps 
be considered significant. 
V.    IS A SIGNIFICANT RECITAL ESTABLISHING AN IRREBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION OF GIFT SO EASILY RECOGNIZED? 
The seminal case on the use of parol evidence in the face of a significant 
recital is the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Messer v. Johnson.240  The 
Messer court, writing through Justice Walker, introduces their holding 
regarding the use of parol evidence in an interspousal transfer that 
employed a significant recital, thus: 
 
233. Id. 
234. Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 548. 
235. Id. at 548.   
236. Id. at 548 (first citing Reaves, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7; Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 726–27; then 
citing Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 912–13; Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 80–81). 
237. Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 547–48.  
238. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (emphasis added) (first citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 
452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970); then citing Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)). 
239. See id. (“The deed was unambiguous on its face, and, as a matter of law, it effectively 
transferred an undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property to Brenda.”). 
240. Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1968). 
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Real estate was conveyed to a married woman.  Her husband joined in the 
deed as one of the grantors, and the instrument declared that the land was 
conveyed to the grantee as her separate estate and to her sole and separate use.241  The 
question to be decided is whether parol evidence may be received to show a 
resulting trust in favor of the community estate.  We reaffirm the rule that it 
may not.242 
Messer v. Johnson, as noted in this article, addresses the underpinnings of 
proper characterization of marital property subject to interspousal transfers 
by explaining the principles of resulting trusts.243  What is of import is that 
the opinion in Messer v. Johnson was a reiteration of long existing and 
accepted Texas law. 
For example, the Messer v. Johnson opinion cites the 1900 Texas Supreme 
Court case of Kahn v. Kahn,244 recognizing that when there is a significant 
recital establishing that wife paid for the property “out of her separate funds 
and for her separate use and benefit,”245 that: 
without proof of fraud or mistake in the insertion of the recitals in the deed, 
parol evidence was not admissible to show that the maker of it did not intend to 
convey the property to his wife as her separate property, and this for the reason 
that the deed on its face clearly expressed such intent.246 
This basis for characterizing, in conformance with a separate property 
recital and such recital’s appurtenant bar to parol evidence, is what  
the Raymond court ignored, even though the Raymond court offhandedly 
mentioned “express recitals.”247  Messer v. Johnson also references like 
holdings by the Texas Supreme Court, such as McKivett v. McKivett 248 
 
 
241. This is the essence of the Messer v. Johnson significant recital.  Id. at 909 (emphasis added). 
242. Id. 
243. See id. at 910–11 (emphasis added) (explaining the results of interspousal transfers by 
analyzing the characterization of marital property in Kahn v. Kahn). 
244. Kahn v. Kahn, 58 S.W. 825 (Tex. 1900). 
245. Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 911 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kahn, 58 S.W. at 825). 
246. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kahn, 58 S.W. at 825). 
247. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 
248. McKivett v. McKivett, 70 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1934).  See Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 911 (citing 
McKivett, 70 S.W.2d at 695–96) (reciting the McKivett holding that “[p]arol evidence should not be 
admitted to prove that [a deed] was conveyed for a different purpose or use” because parol evidence 
is inadmissible to establish a trust contrary to the plain intention of the grantor expressed in the deed 
(quoting McKivett, 70 S.W.2d at 696)). 
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and Lindsay v. Clayman.249 
Because Messer v. Johnson is the seminal case in this area of marital 
property characterization, and even though it is a reiteration of the law, the 
facts that give rise to a case that caused the Texas Supreme Court to revisit 
a settled question are important.  During the Johnson marriage, certain real 
property was conveyed to wife (Pearl) by a third party; however, husband, who 
had no ownership interest in the property, chose to join in the conveyance 
as a grantor.250  This joinder placed husband in privity with the contract 
establishing that he had express knowledge of and approved the 
conveyance.251  The property was conveyed to wife as “her sole and separate 
estate, and to her sole and separate use.”252  The Texas Supreme Court noted 
that “[t]his recital appears in the granting clause, the habendum clause and 
the warranty clause, but the deed does not state that the consideration was 
paid by the grantee out of her separate property.”253 
In Messer v. Johnson, wife dies and surviving husband sought to establish 
that the property so conveyed to his wife was community property.254  At 
trial, husband was allowed (ultimately deemed in error) to testify that the 
purchase price of more than $12,000 was paid from his and his deceased 
wife’s community funds.255  He further testified that the property was 
placed in wife’s name so that his adult son from a prior marriage would not 
assert an interest in the property should he have died before his wife.256  
Clearly, the Johnson husband was trying to shield his wife from confrontation 
with his son from a previous marriage should wife survive him.  However, 
best-laid plans can go awry and here, contrary to the obvious plan, wife died 
 
249. Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1952).  See Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 911 (citing 
Lindsay, 254 S.W.2d 777) (reciting the Lindsay holding that use of parol evidence is impermissible to 
establish a resulting trust that favors the community where a third party conveys property to wife as 
her separate property in a transaction that husband partakes in to a degree sufficient to consider him a 
party to the conveyance instrument). 
250. Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 909–10. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 910 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
253. Id. 
254. By wife’s will, husband was devised the entirety of her community estate but was only 
given a life estate in her separate property.  Id.  Wife’s niece, Myrtle Messer, was devised the remainder 
interest.  Id.  Husband was given the right to sell the separate property if necessary to maintain a 
comfortable existence, but he had gifted it to his current wife and wanted to establish that he was free 
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first.257  The jury, having been allowed to hear the parol evidence of 
husband, was convinced by husband’s story and found that the property was 
the community of husband and deceased wife.258 
The niece, Myrtle Messer, who under certain circumstances was to 
inherit her aunt’s separate property, properly objected to husband’s 
testimony because it violated the parol evidence rule; thereafter, the niece 
appealed.259  The niece urged on appeal that the parol evidence was admitted 
in error and that the subject property should be recognized as the separate 
property of the deceased wife, based on significant recitals in the 
conveyancing documents.260  The Texas Supreme Court agreed with niece 
and held that the only time that parol evidence could be used to explain 
or contradict a significant recital would be when equitable allegations of 
“fraud, duress or mistake”261 regarding the inclusion of the significant 
recital are made.262  No such equitable arguments were made by husband 
in Messer v. Johnson.263 
The case of Messer v. Johnson also mentions, by way of comparison, the case 
of Jackson v. Hernandez,264 wherein parol evidence was allowed.  In Jackson 
v. Hernandez, the deed did not include a significant recital and the parol 
evidence did not alter the deed, but merely explained that while the property 
was held in the name of her mother, the daughter who paid the purchase price 
for property should have the reversionary interest (a trust results to her 
benefit) after the mother died.265  In light of these cases one wonders, what 
words should have been present for the Raymond court to properly bar parol 
evidence? 
VI.    WHAT WORDS ARE RECOGNIZED AS SIGNIFICANT RECITALS? 
The aforementioned opinion of Reaves v. Reaves, provided explanation of 
what is meant by these words of art, “significant recital.”266  Significant 
recitals are also known as express recitals, and such was the term used by the 
 
257. Id. 
258. See id. (finding the conveyance to husband and wife to be community property). 
259. Id. at 908. 
260. Id. at 912. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. See generally id. at 908 (mentioning no equitable arguments asserted by the husband). 
264. Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1955). 
265. Id. at 189. 
266.  Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland 
Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
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Raymond Court267 as well as mentioned in Reaves.268  While an unpublished, 
memorandum opinion, the Reaves Court explains that significant/express 
recitals usually have language establishing a spouse paid for the subject 
property with separate funds or said property was simply conveyed as the 
separate property of the named owning spouse.269  More particularly, the 
court noted that significant/express recitals “involve the use of specific 
terminology. . . . ‘[involving] deeds which expressly state that property is 
conveyed to grantees as their separate property or for their separate use.’”270  To 
further clarify, the Reaves court opined “[t]he decision to exclude parol 
evidence rests ‘not upon a recital of contractual consideration, but upon the 
fact that the instrument stipulated, in effect, that the beneficial ownership 
of the property was conveyed to the [spouse] for [his or her] separate 
use.’”271 
In Reaves, husband’s urging of the irrebuttable gift presumption and his 
use of the parol evidence rule as a bar to wife’s explanation, is very 
unusual.  In Reaves, the wife, Karen, had purchased an annuity with the 
proceeds of a life insurance policy that she received upon the death of her 
first husband who was in the military and who died.272  Karen owned this 
annuity prior to her marriage to her current husband, John, whom she was 
now divorcing.273  During her marriage to John, Karen suffered 
debilitating physical pain and was on a regiment of high intensity pain 
relievers, including Vicodin.274 
While Karen was undergoing this treatment, John introduced Karen to a 
financial planner who attended the same church as the couple.275  A new 
financial plan was concocted for the couple and Karen’s annuity, that she 
 
267. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no 
pet) (“A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to 
contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or 
mistake.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex.1970); Massey v. Massey, 
807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied))). 
268. See Reaves, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6 (holding parol evidence is not allowed to contradict any 
express recitals in a deed). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 1998, no pet). 
271. Id. (alterations in original) (citing Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1955)). 
272. Id. at *1. 
273. Id. 
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owned before marriage, was converted to a different annuity that 
encompassed a change of owner that had the effect of naming John as a co-
owner and stripped Karen of her sole right to make changes to the annuity 
in the future.276 
Upon divorce, John argued that parol evidence should not be allowed 
to rebut the gift presumption that arose by virtue of Karen naming John as 
a co-owner of what had been her separate property.277  John argued that 
there was a significant recital that barred the use of parol evidence and that 
Karen should not be allowed to testify to the circumstances surrounding 
the change of ownership, specifically:278 
John points to part of the letter of acknowledgment of the Future Annuity 
II that Karen signed that contains a statement that she “ordered the liquidation 
and transfer [of an] investment [she] currently own[s].”  This, he says, is a 
“separate property recital” because it states that the consideration for the 
Future Annuity II was Karen’s separate property.  He also cites the prospectus 
for the Future Annuity II because it states that “[j]oint owners each own an 
undivided interest in the contract.”279 
Thereafter the Eastland Court of Appeals provides a most eloquent 
explanation of language that can properly be considered a significant recital.  
Rather than paraphrasing, the Eastland Court’s analysis is worthy of 
quotation, thus: 
The recitals to which John refers in this case do not state that John purchased 
his interest in the annuity with his own separate property.  Also, the recitals 
are not that the property will be John’s “separate” or “sole and separate” 
property or for his “separate use.”  The words “separate property” or “separate 
use” are never used in the contract, letter of acknowledgment, or prospectus.  
Though the contract uses the term “joint owner,” which is defined in the 
prospectus as giving joint owners “an undivided interest in the contract,” 
nothing in the documents indicates that there has been a conveyance from 
Karen to John or that any sort of transfer in beneficial ownership has 
occurred.  The trial court found that Karen relied upon Dwinell’s280 advice 
in the transaction, but when asked about the meaning of “undivided interest,” 
 
276. Id. at *2–3. 
277. Id. at *6. 
278. See id. (pointing to a “separate property recital” in the instrument of conveyance). 
279. Id. (alterations in original). 
280. Dwinell is the financial planner to whom Karen was introduced by John.  Id. at *1. 
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Dwinell testified, “You’re going way back in my memory banks” and “That’s a 
legal term and I’m sorry.”  Because the contract does not expressly recite the 
character and use of the property, we find that the parol evidence rule does not 
prevent introduction of evidence to rebut the presumption of a gift.281 
The Eastland court’s analysis, taken in conjunction with Karen’s 
testimony that she never intended to make a gift, rebutted the gift 
presumption by clear and convincing evidence.  If one looks to the language, 
or lack thereof as to gift, sole or separate use, or purchase by sole or separate 
funds in the Raymond case, it is clear there was no significant recital.282  
Raymond, based upon all case law, is wrong. 
VII.    WHAT HELL HATH RAYMOND WROUGHT— 
THE FAR REACHING EFFECT OF A RENEGADE OPINION  
It is clear from the foregoing that the rules governing the use of parol 
evidence in light of significant recitals are very well established, as are the 
rules establishing what language is necessary for a recital to be considered 
significant.  If one applies the rules as explained, surely the use of parol 
evidence should be allowed if a Raymond situation arises.  One might 
easily disregard Raymond as an anomaly.  Such complacency, however, 
should not be the approach taken to this problem because there are some 
courts and some appellate lawyers that love Raymond. 
In the years since the Raymond opinion, nearly fifteen appellate opinions283 
have acknowledged Raymond, and some of these opinions appear to be 
 
281. Id. at *6. 
282. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 
283. The following cases cite Raymond with regard to holdings that address the gift 
presumption and the use of evidence to rebut same, as follows: Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W. 3d 541, 
548 (Tex. App.⎯Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701, 709 
(Tex. App.⎯Texarkana 2013, no pet.); In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tex. 
App.⎯Amarillo 2011, no pet.); Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex. App.⎯Dallas 
2007, pet. denied).  The Magness case, is the most oft cited of the Raymond progeny, and the cases that 
cite it while addressing the gift presumption and the use of evidence to rebut same, as follows: Cardenas 
v. Cardenas, No. 13–16–00064–CV, 2017 WL 1089683, at *2 (Tex. App.⎯Corpus Christi Mar. 23, 
2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Pearson v. Pearson, No. 03–13–00802–CV, 2016 WL 240683, at *5 (Tex. 
App.⎯Austin Jan. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); In the Interest of C.E.W., No. 05–14–00459–CV, 
2015 WL 5099336, at *2 (Tex. App.⎯Dallas Aug. 31, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Gonzalez-Limon 
v. Gonzalez, No. 04–14–00011–CV, 2014 WL 6475800, at *1 (Tex. App.⎯San Antonio Nov. 19, 
2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Clay v. Clay, No. 05–13–00624–CV, 2014 WL 2993812, at *2 (Tex. 
App.⎯Dallas June 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mora v. Mora, No. 04–12–00638–CV, 2014 WL 
769441, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Motley v. Motley, 
390 S.W.3d 689, 693–94 (Tex. App.⎯Dallas 2012, no pet.); Zoller v. Zoller, No. 01–09– 00992–CV, 
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expressions of “love” citing Raymond or its progeny to disallow parol 
evidence, even when there was no significant/express recital, when 
considering the character of marital property conveyed between spouses.  
Even more “loving” than these few courts, would be numerous appellate 
lawyers who cite Raymond in hopes maintaining a gift made to the spouse 
they represent or, on occasion, who are seeking to have an appellate court 
render that their spouse did indeed receive a gift via an irrebuttable 
presumption.  Further, one cannot begin to determine the number of trial 
court cases where the Raymond analysis is proffered and accepted to the 
detriment of a spouse unable to afford an appeal.  For this reason, the cases 
citing both Raymond and its most visible progeny beg review. 
The most current case to cite Raymond regarding the gift presumption and 
rebuttal by the use of parol evidence is the case that spawned this article, 
Stearns v. Martens.  The Stearns case has been discussed throughout the article 
and therefore need not be reiterated at this stage, but to say that the 
Fourteenth Court of Appeals did the right thing.  However, other cases that 
have cited Raymond, will be included in this summative survey. 
Magness v. Magness,284 is the most oft cited of the Raymond progeny in 
opinions addressing the interspousal gift presumption and the use of parol 
evidence to rebut same.  In Magness, there was an interspousal transfer that 
occurred pursuant to the refinance of a home.285  The deed evidences that 
wife as grantor transferred a one-half interest in what had been her 
separate property home to husband, as grantee.286  The actual language of 
the deed is not provided and the parol evidence rule is not mentioned in the 
Magness opinion.  While the trial allowed the wife to testify that she had no 
intention to make a gift of the home to the husband and only signed the 
deed as a condition of refinancing home, the trial court nonetheless 
determined that because wife did not establish that the deed was procured by 
fraud, accident, or mistake, evidence of her intent could not be considered.287  
The trial court found that wife had gifted half of her separate property home 
 
2011 WL 1587358, at *2 (Tex. App.⎯Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Rosensky 
v. Rosensky, No. 01–09–01029–CV, 2011 WL 743164, at *4 (Tex. App.⎯Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 
2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ussery v. Ussery, No. 03–10–00183–CV, 2010 WL 4910049, at *2 (Tex. 
App.⎯Austin Dec. 2, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
284. Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). 
285. See id. at 913 (explaining wife thought the deed was a necessary part of refinancing and did 
not intend to give husband a gift of interest in the home). 
286. Id. 
287. See id. (“The trial court was free to disbelieve any of all of [wife]’s testimony.” (citing 
Cardwell v. Cardwell, 195 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.))). 
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to husband so that it was half wife’s separate property and half husband’s 
separate property; this was affirmed on appeal.288 
The Magness case has been often used to deny a spouse the right to present 
evidence of intent.  However, in the Moncey case, the outcome was somewhat 
different.  In re Marriage of Moncey289 included a deed that provided: 
That Pamela Harris Parrish and Becky Lynn Hutto, owning their interest 
in the property below as their sole and separate property and owning other 
property as their homestead, for and in consideration of the exchange of the 
property described herein, has granted, transferred and conveyed and by these 
presents does grant, transfer and convey unto Tammie Harris Moncey and 
her Husband John Moncey . . . all of Grantor’s interest in the following 
described real property . . . .290 
The foregoing was a deed conveying twenty-three-acres and a home from a 
trust corpus to husband and wife.291  John Moncey, husband, argued on 
appeal that the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to determine 
the grantor’s intent, urging that the parol evidence rule barred the evidence.292  
Specifically, the trial court considered affidavits of wife’s sisters and of the 
husband, each of which addressed the intent of wife’s sisters, the grantor’s 
in this case.293  Husband tried to invoke the Raymond/Magness rule to 
exclude parol evidence in a third party transaction where both spouses were 
named in the deed conveyancing the disputed property.294  The appellate 
court recognizes the Raymond/Magness rule for interspousal transactions, 
but in apparent keeping with the dicta of Raymond, determines that the 
parol evidence rule does not apply to third party transactions wherein parol 
evidence can be admitted.295  The property was held to be the separate 
property of the wife, sister of the grantors, and in keeping with the affidavits, 
parol evidence, of the sisters.296 
 
288. Id. 
289. In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.). 
290. Id. at 707. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 709. 
293. See id. at 708–09 (stating affidavits from wife’s sisters contended it was never their intention 
for husband to have any ownership of the property). 
294. See id. at 709 (“[Husband] asserts that since he is a named grantee in the deed without 
ambiguity, no further evidence of intent may be received.” (citing CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec., 
L.L.P. v. Old TJC Co., 177 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied))).  
295. Id. at 710–11. 
296. See id. at 714 (concluding wife established the property was her separate property). 
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In re Marriage of Skarda,297 is a refinancing case, where husband refinanced 
his separate property.298  As part of the refinancing, husband and wife signed 
a warranty deed conveying the property to husband and wife as “joint tenants 
with right of survivorship.”299  A deed of trust identified husband and wife, 
jointly, as borrower.300  Husband testified that it was not his intent to gift 
half of the property to wife.301  Wife on the on the other hand, was not so 
clear, asserting she owned half of the property by gift or otherwise and 
even asserting that her interest was community.302  While the evidence of 
intent was allowed, the court determined that the gift presumption was not 
rebutted because husband failed to offer evidence of equitable defenses, i.e., 
fraud, accident, mistake, or undue influence.303 
Leaving the cases that cite Raymond, but instead depend solely on the 
like holding of Magness, the survey begins with Cardenas v. Cardenas.304  In 
Cardenas, husband obtained a $30,000 loan and had his wife use those funds 
to purchase a piece of property from a neighbor.305  The property was 
deeded to wife as her “sole and separate property,” a classic significant 
recital.306  The parol evidence rule was not specifically mentioned in the 
opinion, and both husband and wife testified regarding the circumstances 
of the transaction and husband testified as to his intent.307  The court 
never mentions that parol evidence cannot be used when a significant recital 
is in play, stating only that husband’s “testimony is insufficient to disturb this 
[gift] presumption.”308  In light of the significant recital in this case, your 
author has no quarrel with a strict application of the parol evidence rule, 
even though not mentioned by the court as it should have been. 
 
297. In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). 
298. Id. at 668. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. See id. at 672 (alleging his only intent was to refinance the property). 
302. Id. 
303. See id. (holding the joint tenancy created in wife through the deed was her separate property 
in the absence of evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake). 
304. Cardenas v. Cardenas, No. 13–16–00064–CV, 2017 WL 1089683 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
305. Id. at *2. 
306. Id. 
307. See generally id. (admitting, although not explicitly, parol evidence at trial). 
308. Id. 
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Pearson v. Pearson309 is a rather complicated310 stock transfer case in which 
parol evidence of intent was allowed.  While there is not heavy reliance on 
the Magness case, it is mentioned.311  Here the testimony of wife and her 
mother, the transferors, established that there was no intent to make a gift 
of the business to the husband.312  There was also evidence that husband 
“agreed to pay Mrs. Pearson for her three shares of stock in the event of 
divorce, casting doubt on its character as a gift[,]”313 although gift tax 
returns were filed and explained away as having been done at husband’s 
direction.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination that 
no gift had been made to husband based on the parol evidence rightly 
allowed.314 
In re C.E.W.,315 is a case which properly applies the exception to the bar on 
parol evidence when a significant recital exists.316  Here, husband as grantor 
conveyed his entire interest to wife, stating, “ [g]rantor grants and conveys 
the property to Grantee as her sole and separate property.”317  Husband 
asserted that the deed was obtained under duress and the trial court viewed 
the claim of duress, an equitable assertion, in keeping with accident, 
mistake or fraud.318 Parol evidence was allowed as to the duress suffered 
by husband and the gift presumption was overcome and the property was 
determined to be community.319 
 
309. Pearson v. Pearson, No. 03–13–00802–CV, 2016 WL 240683 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 15, 
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
310. Should a transfer of stock ever be in issue, a reading of the entirety of this case is 
recommended.  See id. at *1 (describing a dispute between husband and wife about an interest in a 
business husband acquired during the marriage and whether it was separate or community).  
311. See id. at *6 (citing the Magness rule that “[a] gift is a voluntary transfer of property to 
another made gratuitously and without consideration.” (citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 
912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied))). 
312. Id. at *9. 
313. Id. 
314. See id. (“Assuming [husband] raised the presumption of gift by showing the transfer from 
his wife and mother-in-law, our review of the evidence reflects that the trial court could find from 
clear-and-convincing evidence that [wife] and her parents did not intend to make a separate-property 
gift . . . .” ). 
315. In re C.E.W., No. 05–14–00459–CV, 2015 WL 5099336 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2015, 
pet. denied) (mem. op.). 
316. See id. at *3 (holding trial court properly treated property as community after substantive 
and probative evidence showed deed was procured by duress). 
317. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
318. See id. at *2 (“The parties dispute whether the trial court could have properly concluded 
the deed was procured by duress, fraud, accident or mistake.”). 
319. Id. at *3. 
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In Gonzalez-Limon v. Gonzalez,320 husband and wife purchased property 
after marriage and some three months after the purchase husband as 
grantor conveyed his interest to wife.321  Parol evidence was considered 
and husband explained that the property was conveyed to wife to take 
advantage of her disability to gain tax exempt status as to the property.322  The 
reason for conveyance did not encompass fraud, accident or mistake 
and thus could not be used to rebut the gift presumption.323 
Clay v. Clay,324 concerns a deed of the couple’s homestead property to 
wife from husband without a significant recital.  The trial court allowed both 
husband and wife to testify as to the initial acquisition of the property—
funds from a  settlement husband received— and about the conveyance 
to wife.325  The only evidence presented to rebut the presumption that the 
homestead was a gift to wife was husband’s testimony that he only intended 
it as a temporary transfer to wife, though “[a]t the time, [he] did not have a 
plan for when [he] would reacquire the property or how it would play 
out.”326  The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision because it was 
reasonable to conclude that husband failed to show fraud, accident, or 
mistake.327  Thus, the trial court rightfully allowed evidence of intent, but 
wrongfully evaluated the evidence in terms of a gift presumption that could 
only be rebutted by an equitable defense, not a lack of donative intent.328  
The Clay case, as Raymond, requires an equitable defense even when 
there is not a significant recital; it is a prime example of the need for 
clarification of Raymond and its ilk. 
 
320. Gonzalez-Limon v. Gonzalez, No. 04–14–00011–CV, 2014 WL 6475800 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Nov. 19, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
321. Id. at *1. 
322. Id. 
323. See id. (“Because the record contains no evidence to rebut the presumption that [wife] 
received the Property as separate property by gift, the trial court did not err in finding that [husband] 
gifted his interest in the Property to [wife].” (citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665, 672 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 
2011, no pet.))). 
324. Clay v. Clay, No. 05–13–00624–CV, 2014 WL 2993812 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 30, 2014, 
pet. denied) (mem. op.). 
325. Id. at *2. 
326. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
327. See id. at *3 (concluding trial court did not err in holding husband led to rebut the 
presumption of a gift to wife). 
328. See id. (holding that because a presumption of gift may be rebutted by proof of fraud, 
accident, or mistake, husband’s testimony as to lack of donative intent was insufficient to rebut said 
presumption). 
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Mora v. Mora,329 entails a deed from husband to wife, thus: “The deed is 
from Salvador as grantor to Sylvia as grantee and conveys a ‘one-half (½) 
undivided community interest in and to’ the property.”330  The question 
before the court was whether this conveyed half of the property to Sylvia (her 
name had not appeared on the deed before) or did this convey the entirety 
to her as separate property?331  The most disturbing aspect of the case is 
the court’s reasoning, thus: 
In this case, the testimony of Salvador and the attorney was conflicting; however, 
the language of the deed from Salvador to Sylvia is unambiguous.  Accordingly, the trial 
judge could have chosen to disbelieve Salvador’s testimony, and the evidence is 
sufficient to support the trial court’s characterization of the property as 
Sylvia’s separate property.332 
The language is disturbing because it seems to infer, much as did Raymond, 
that the conveyance of an undivided interest is a significant recital (with 
which this author takes issues), while at the same time confusing it with 
testimony that would not have been considered if rules governing significant 
recital were properly applied.  Again, a case that supports the need for further 
elucidation in this area. 
In Motley v. Motley,333 the actual language of the deed, entered into as part 
of a refinancing transaction, was not mentioned, but the deed granted the 
husband an undivided one-half interest in property that wife asserted had 
originally been her separate property.334  The wife testified that she did not 
make a gift to her husband and she did not know that by virtue of the 
refinance that her husband would obtain an interest in what she thought 
was her property; indeed, she testified she would not have refinanced if 
she had known of the resulting effect.335  Nonetheless, the appellate 
court confirmed the decision of the trial court recognizing that the trial court 
judged the credibility of witnesses.336  At least it appears in Motley that the 
 
329. Mora v. Mora, No. 04–12–00638–CV, 2014 WL 769441 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
Feb. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
330. Id. at *7. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
333. Motley v. Motley, 390 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). 
334. Id. at 691, 693. 
335. Id. at 693. 
336. See id. (“As fact finder . . . the trial court was free to disbelieve any or all of appellant’s 
testimony and conclude that appellant failed to the rebut the gift presumption.” (citing Magness v. 
Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied))). 
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rules were followed in that there was no significant recital and parol evidence 
was considered. 
Zoller v. Zoller337 is somewhat unusual in that it involves an Oldsmobile 
and a Mercury Marquis that husband claims were gifted from his father 
and therefore his, husband’s,338 separate property.339  Interestingly, while 
husband claims a gift, he acknowledged that he had agreed to pay for one of 
the cars, but to pay less than a quarter of its fair market value.340  No other 
evidence was offered as to the gift from husband’s father.  The court 
deemed this insufficient to establish a gift especially in light of the 
testimony of purchase.341 
In Rosensky v. Rosensky,342 wife claimed that her husband made a gift to her 
of $72,000 that was used to purchase the homestead.343  While there was no 
significant recital in the conveyancing documents, wife did rely on a letter 
which she asserted husband signed two days before closing 
acknowledging the gift; husband vehemently denied the authenticity of 
the letter.344  Husband understood that the property was to be placed in 
both of the parties names, and it was.345  In this case, an interspousal 
transfer of funds, any gift presumption could be rebutted by parol evidence 
in light of the fact that there was no significant recital.  Essentially, the 
question came down to credibility and wife’s separate property claim was 
defeated by testimony of the husband.346  The appellate court denied wife’s 
separate property claim.  
 
337. Zoller v. Zoller, No. 01–09–00992–CV, 2011 WL 1587358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] Apr. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
338. “This is not your father’s Oldsmobile[!]”  See generally Oldsmobile: Victim of Its Own Brand, 
SLATE (Dec. 13, 2000, 2:31 PM), https://slate.com/business/2000/12/oldsmobile-victim-of-its-own-
brand.html [https://perma.cc/V8M4-W567] (highlighting an Oldsmobile advertising campaign). 
339. Zoller, 2011 WL 1587358, at *2. 
340. Id. 
341. See id. (“The very fact that [husband]’s father agreed to and received consideration in exchange 
for the Mercury, however, established that it was not given as a gift.” (citing Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 912)). 
342. Rosensky v. Rosensky, No. 01–09–01029–CV, 2011 WL 743164 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
343. Id. at *5. 
344. See id. (chronicling husband’s testimonial attempts to rebut the presumption of donative 
intent). 
345. Id. 
346. Id. at *6. 
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Ussery v. Ussery347 is another case where the actual language of the deed is 
not mentioned, however it is without doubt that there was not a 
significant recital.  The conveyance is described by the court as follows: 
Ussery contends and stated in his declaration to the trial court that the real 
property was community property, but he does not dispute that he signed the 
deed transferring the real property, and the deed with his signature was an 
exhibit at trial.  Steczkowski348 also testified that Ussery signed the deed 
after he was incarcerated and that a sergeant at the prison notarized his 
signature.  This evidence creates a presumption that the real property was 
Steczkowski’s separate property by gift and, therefore, is some evidence of a 
substantive and probative character to support a finding that Ussery gave his 
interest in the real property to Steczkowski.349 
The appellate court considered that the reason for transferring the 
property to wife was so that if husband was sued by any of his victims, the 
property would not be subject to such liability; however this was not 
considered by the appellate court to be evidence that wife obtained the 
conveyance by “fraud, accident or mistake.”350  The fact that the court 
analyzes this in terms “fraud, accident or mistake” makes cases that 
encompass conveyances with significant recitals troubling.  This is not a 
significant recital case.  Husband’s testimony should have been allowed to 
rebut the presumed gift and weighed against wife’s assertions that he made 
a gift to her, it should not have been constrained to a determination of 
whether it met the elements of “fraud, accident or mistake.”  Ussery is yet 
another case that establishes the need for clarification. 
VIII.    CONCLUSION 
It is indisputable that there are conflicting opinions in the intermediate 
Texas appellate courts regarding the use of parol evidence to rebut the gift 
presumption.  Of course, this makes the question of parol evidence when 
an express or significant recital is lacking, ripe for review by the Texas 
Supreme Court.351 
 
347. Ussery v. Ussery, No. 03–10–00183–CV, 2010 WL 4910049 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 2, 
2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
348. Steczkowski is Ussery’s wife.  Id. at *1. 
349. Id. at *3 (citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. 
denied)). 
350. Id. 
351. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
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We can only hope that this question reaches the Texas Supreme Court so 
that the court can once again explain to bench and bar resulting trust rules, 
significant recitals, and parol evidence.  However, until that occurs, it is 
hoped that this article will shine a light on interspousal gifts, resulting trust 
rules, significant recitals, and parol evidence so that such will find their 
proper place in the Texas community property compendium once again.  If 
Raymond is overruled, or hopefully ignored, then there is no reason not to 
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